

Laboratorio “Maschilità, Devianza, Crimine”

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Consigliamo la lettura dei seguenti tre saggi, nell'ordine proposto:

1. Messerschmidt, J. W. (2018). Structured Action Theory. In: J. W. Messerschmidt, *Masculinities and Crime. A Quarter Century of Theory and Research. 25th Anniversary Edition*. Rowman & Littlefield, 3-22.
2. Prokos, A. & Padavic, I. (2002). “There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches”: Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 9, 439-459.
3. Jewkes, Y. (2005). Men Behind Bars: “Doing” Masculinity as an Adaptation to Imprisonment. *Men and Masculinities*, 8, 44-63.

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Chapter One

Structured Action Theory

In this opening chapter I present a theoretical framework—what I label “structured action theory”—for conceptualizing masculinities and crime. To understand the social construction of masculinities and crime we must first grasp what structured action theory labels “doing” sex, gender, and sexuality. Following this I discuss how the theory engages with the relationship among hegemonic masculinities, nonhegemonic masculinities, embodiment, and masculinity challenges.

DOING SEX, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY

Reflecting various theoretical origins (Archer 2003, 2007, 2012; Connell 1987, 1995a; Giddens 1976, 1984; Goffman 1963, 1972, 1979; Kessler and McKenna 1978; Mouzelis 2008; Sartre 1956; West and Fenstermaker 1995; West and Zimmerman 1987), structured action theory emphasizes the reflexive construction of sex, gender, and sexuality as situated social, interactional, and embodied accomplishments. In other words, sex, gender, and sexuality are all social constructions and grow out of embodied social practices in specific social structural settings and serve to inform such practices in reciprocal relation. Understanding each of these is essential to conceptualizing masculinities and crime.

Regarding “sex,” historical and social conditions shape the character and definition of “sex” (social identification as “male” or “female”). Sex and its meanings are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context in which they are embedded. Historical studies on the definition of sex show its clear association with sexuality, and gender has proved always to be already involved. The work of Thomas Laqueur (1990) is exemplary in this regard, and in his important book, *Making Sex*, he shows

that for two thousand years a “one-sex model” dominated scientific and popular thought in which male and female bodies were not conceptualized in terms of difference. From antiquity to the beginning of the seventeenth century, male and female bodies were seen as having the same body parts, even in terms of genitalia, with the vagina regarded as an interior penis, the vulva as foreskin, the uterus as scrotum, and the ovaries as testicles. Women thus had the same body as men, but the positioning of its parts was different: as one doggerel verse of the period stated, “Women are but men turned outside in” (4). In the “one-sex model” the sexes were not seen as different in *kind* but rather in *degree*—woman simply was a lesser form of man. And as Laqueur explains, “*Sex*, or the body, must be understood as the epiphenomenon, while *gender*, what we would take to be a cultural category, was primary or ‘real’” (8). Inequality was imposed on bodies from the outside and seen as God’s “marker” of a male and female distinction. To be a man or a woman was to have a specific place in society decreed by God, “not to be organically one or the other of two incommensurable sexes. Sex before the seventeenth-century, in other words, was still a sociological and not an ontological category” (8).

What emerged after the Enlightenment was a “two-sex model” involving a foundational dichotomy between now two and only two distinct and opposite sexes, as no longer did scientific and popular thought “regard woman as a lesser version of man along a vertical axis of infinite gradations but rather an altogether different creature along a horizontal axis whose middle ground was largely empty” (Laqueur 1990, 148). And Michel Foucault’s well-known discussion of the “hermaphrodite”—what is referred today as the intersexed—demonstrates that by the mid-1800s there was no allowance for any human being to occupy a “middle ground” through “a mixture of two sexes in a single body,” which consequently limited “the free choice of indeterminate individuals” and thus henceforth “everybody was to have one and only one sex” (Foucault 1980, vii). Individuals accepted previously as representatives of the “middle ground” (“hermaphrodites”) were now required to submit to expert medical diagnosis to uncover their “true” sex. As Foucault continues:

Everybody was to have his or her primary, profound, determined and determining sexual identity; as for the elements of the other sex that might appear, they could only be accidental, superficial, or even quite simply illusory. From the medical point of view, this meant that when confronted with a hermaphrodite, the doctor was no longer concerned with recognizing the presence of the two sexes, juxtaposed or intermingled, or with knowing which of the two prevailed over the other, but rather with deciphering the true sex that was hidden beneath ambiguous appearances. (vii)

Arguably, then, under the “two-sex model” it became commonplace to view *the* male sex and *the* female sex as “different in every conceivable aspect of body and soul, in every physical and moral aspect—an anatomy and physiology of incommensurability replaced a metaphysics of hierarchy in the representation of woman in relation to man” (Laqueur 1990, 5–6).

Predictably, these two now fixed, incommensurable, opposite sexes also are conceptualized as *the* source of the political, economic and cultural lives of men and women (gender and sexuality), since “biology—the stable, ahistorical, sexed body—is understood to be the epistemic foundation for prescriptive claims about the social order” (6). It was now understood as “natural” that women are for example passive, submissive, and vulnerable and men are for example active, aggressive, and perilous. And given that anatomy is now destiny, a heterosexual instinct to procreate proceeds from the body and is “the natural state of the architecture of two incommensurable opposite sexes” (233).

The shift in thinking to a “two-sex model,” consisting now of two different types of humans with complementary heterosexual natures and desires, corresponded to the emergence of the public-private split: it was now “natural” for men to enter the public realm of society and it was “natural” for women to remain in the private sphere. Explaining these distinct gendered spaces was “resolved by grounding social and cultural differentiation of the sexes in a biology of incommensurability” (Laqueur 1990, 19). In other words, “gender” and “sexuality” became subordinated to “sex” and biology was now primary: *the* foundation of difference and inequality between men and women.

Laqueur makes clear that the change to a two-sex model was not the result of advances in science, inasmuch as the re-evaluation of the body as primary occurred approximately 100 years before alleged supporting scientific discoveries appeared. And although anatomical and physiological differences clearly exist between male and female bodies, what counts as “sex” is determined socially. In short, natural scientists had no interest in “seeing” two distinct sexes at the anatomical and concrete physiological level “until such differences became politically important” and “sex” therefore became “explicable only within the context of battles over gender and power” (10, 11).

The historical work of both Laqueur and Foucault suggests that “sex differences” do not naturally precede “gender and sexual differences.” And as Wendy Cealey Harrison (2006) insightfully observes, it is virtually impossible to ever entirely separate the body and our understanding of it from its socially determined milieu. Arguably, what is now necessary is a reconceptualization of “the taken-for-grantedness of ‘sex’ as a form of categorization for human beings and examining the ways in which such a categorization is built” (43).

Following this suggestion by Cealey Harrison, it is important to recognize that in an important early work from the 1970s, Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna (1978) argued that social action is constructed through taken-for-granted discourses, or what they call “incorrigible propositions.” Our belief in two objectively real, biologically created constant yet opposite sexes is a telling discourse. We assume there are only two sexes; each person is simply an example of one or the other. In other words, we construct a sex dichotomy in which no dichotomy holds biologically, historically, cross-culturally, and contemporaneously (Messerschmidt 2004).

The key process in the social construction of the sex dichotomy is the active way we decide what sex a person is (Kessler and McKenna 1978, 1–20). A significant part of this sex attribution process is the notion that men have penises and women do not. We consider genitals the ultimate criterion in making sex assignments, yet in our daily interactions we continually make sex attributions with a complete lack of information about others’ genitals. Our recognition of another’s sex is dependent upon the exhibit of such bodily characteristics as speech, hair, clothing, physical appearance, and other aspects of personal front—through this embodied presentation we “do” sex, and it is this doing that becomes a substitute for the concealed genitalia. In short, “sex” is socially constructed; we objectify ourselves as a “sex” object.

Nevertheless, “doing” *gender* (West and Zimmerman 1987) entails considerably more than the “social emblems” representing membership in one of two sex categories. Rather, the social construction of gender involves a situated social, interactional, and embodied accomplishment. Gender grows out of social practices in specific settings and serves to inform such practices in reciprocal relation. Although “sex” defines social identification as “male” or “female,” “doing gender” systematically corroborates and qualifies that sex identification and category through embodied social interaction. In effect, there exists a plurality of forms in which gender is constructed: we coordinate our activities to “do” gender in situational ways (West and Zimmerman 1987).

Accordingly, early gender development in childhood occurs through an interactive process between child and parents, other children, and other adults. By reason of this interaction with others—and the social structures this interaction constitutes—children (for the most part) undertake to practice what is being preached, represented, and structured. Raewyn Connell defines the proactive adoption of specific embodied gender practices as the “moment of engagement,” the moment when an individual initiates a project of masculinity or femininity as his or her own (1995a, 122). The young child has in effect located him- or herself in relation to others within a sexed and gendered structured field (Jackson 2007). Children negotiate the socially structured sexed and gendered practices and their accompanying discourses that are prevalent and attributed as such in their particular milieu(s) and, in so

doing, commit themselves to a *fundamental project* of sex and gender self-attribution—for example, “I’m a boy” or “I’m a girl.” This fundamental self-attribution as a boy or as a girl is the primary mode by which agents choose to relate to the world and to express oneself in it, and thus serves as an important constraint and enabler in the social construction of sex, gender, and sexuality. What makes us human is the fact that we construct ourselves by making reflexive choices that transcend given circumstances and propel us into a future that is defined by the consequences of those choices. Doing sex and gender—normally concurrently—is a continuing process in which agents construct patterns of embodied presentations and practices that suggest a particular sex and gender in specific settings and, consequently, project themselves into a future where new situations are encountered and subsequently new reflexive choices are made (Connell 1995a). There exists unity and coherence to one’s fundamental sex and gender project in the sense that we tend to embody this particular sexed and gendered self—for example, “I’m a boy” or “I’m a girl”—over time and space.

Nevertheless, and although agents construct a fundamental project as either male or female, the actual accomplishment of gender may vary situationally—that is, gender is renegotiated continuously through social interaction and, therefore, one’s gendered self may be fraught with contradictions and diversity in gender strategies and practices. For example, agents may situationally construct a specific fundamental gender project (e.g., masculine) that contradicts their bodily sex category (e.g., female).

Sexuality involves all erotic and non-erotic aspects of social life and social being that relate to bodily attraction or intimate bodily contact between individuals, such as arousal, desire, practice, discourse, interaction, relationship, and identity (see Jackson and Scott 2010). “Doing” sexuality encompasses the same interactional processes discussed above for “doing gender” and therefore likewise involves children initially acquiring knowledge primarily about heterosexuality through structured interaction with mothers, fathers, other children, and other adults. This initial process involves the acquisition of mostly non-erotic forms of heterosexual discursive knowledge, such as male-female marital relationships that suggest this is “where babies come from.” However, to adopt such rudimentary heterosexual discursive knowledge, “doing sex” must take primacy. As Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott point out, “We recognize someone as male or female before we make assumptions about heterosexuality or homosexuality; we cannot logically do otherwise” (2010, 91–92). The homosexual-heterosexual socially structured dichotomy hinges on meaningful sexed categories, “on being able to ‘see’ two men or two women as ‘the same’ and a man and a woman as ‘different’” (92). The notion of two and only two sex categories then establishes the discursive rationale for the homosexual-heterosexual socially structured dichotomy.

Once children begin to develop a sense of the erotic aspects of sexuality—which usually occurs through interaction with peers in secondary school—their sense-making is governed by their embodied sexed and gendered self (Jackson 2007). “Doing” sex, gender, and sexuality intersect here, so that our conceptualization of sex and gender impacts our understanding and practice of sexuality (both the erotic and the non-erotic aspects), and it is through sexual practices (once again both the erotic and the non-erotic) that we validate sex and gender. Agents adopt embodied sexual practices as a “moment of engagement,” a moment when the individual begins to affix a specific sexual project to their fundamental sex and gender project, constructing for example, heteromale and heterofemale identities. Sex, gender, and sexuality are produced and reproduced by embodied individuals, and interaction with others is essential to one’s ability to negotiate and fit in to ongoing and situationally structured patterns of sex, gender, and sexuality.

Crucial to this negotiation and “fitting in” is the notion of “accountability” (West and Zimmerman 1987; Hollander 2013). Accountability—as the cornerstone of social structural reproduction—refers to individuals anticipating assessment of their behavior and therefore configuring and orchestrating their embodied actions in relation to how such actions may be interpreted by others in the particular social context in which they occur. In other words, in their daily activities agents attempt to be identified bodily as “female” or “male” through sex, gender, and sexual practices. Within socially structured interaction, then, we encourage and expect others to attribute to us a particular sex category—to avoid negative assessments—and we facilitate the ongoing task of accountability through demonstrating that we are male or female by means of concocted practices that may be interpreted accordingly. The specific meanings of sex, gender, and sexuality are defined in social interaction and therefore through personal practice. Doing gender and sexuality renders social action accountable in terms of structurally available gender and sexual practices appropriate to one’s sex category in the specific social situation in which one acts. It is the particular structured gender and sexual relations in specific settings that give behavior its sexed, gendered, and sexual meanings.

In this view, then, although we decide quite early in life that we’re a boy or a girl and later we adopt an identity as straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, etc., the actual everyday “doing” of sex, gender, and sexuality is accomplished systematically and is never a static or a finished product. Rather, people fashion sex, gender, and sexuality in specific social situations—they are fluid, contingent, provisional, and temporary constructions. People participate in self-regulating conduct whereby they monitor their own and others’ embodied social actions and they respond to and draw from available social structures. This perspective allows for innovation and flexibility in sex, gender, and sexuality construction—and the ongoing potentiality of normative

transgression—but also underscores the ever-present possibility of any sexed, gendered, and sexual activity being assessed by copresent interactants. Sex category serves as a resource for the interpretation of situated social conduct, as copresent interactants in each setting attempt to hold accountable behavior as “female” or “male”; that is, socially defined membership in one sex category is used as a means of discrediting or accepting gender and sexual practices. Although we construct ourselves as male or female, we situationally embody gender and sexuality according to our own unique experiences, and accountability attempts to maintain *congruence* among sex, gender, and sexuality; that is, male = masculinity = sexually desires females, and female = femininity = sexually desires males.

Sex, gender, and sexuality construction results from individuals often—but not always—considering the content of their social action and then acting only after internal deliberation about the purpose and consequence of their behavior. *Reflexivity* refers to the capacity to engage in internal conversations with oneself about particular social experiences and then decide how to respond appropriately. In reflexivity we internally mull over specific social events and interactions, we consider how such circumstances make us feel, we prioritize what matters most, and then we plan and decide how to respond (Archer 2007). Although we internally deliberate and eventually make such reflexive choices to act in particular ways, those choices are based on the situationally and socially structured available sex, gender, and sexual practices and discourses. Notwithstanding that sex, gender, and sexuality simply may at specific times be a habitual and routine social practice (Martin 2003), accountability encourages people to deliberate about and then “do” sex, gender, and sexuality appropriate to particular situations. And accountability and thus reflexivity especially come into play when agents are confronted with a unique social situation—such as a challenge to their sex, gender, or sexuality. Nevertheless, the resulting reflexive social action may not actually have been consciously intended to be a sex, gender, or sexuality practice. The social construction of sex, gender, and sexuality is essential to understanding the orchestration of masculinities and crime. Permit me now to explore the notion of social structures and their relation to social actions and thus structured action.

STRUCTURED ACTION

As the foregoing indicates, although sex, gender, and sexuality are “made,” so to speak, through the variable unification of internal deliberations and thus reflexive self-regulated practices, these embodied practices do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they are influenced by the social structural constraints and enablements we experience in particular social situations. *Social structures,*

defined as recurring patterns of social phenomena (practices and discourses) that tend to transcend time and space and thus constrain and enable behavior in specific ways, “only exist as the reproduced conduct of situated actors” (Giddens 1976, 127). In other words, agents draw upon social structures to engage in social action and in turn social structures are (usually) reproduced through that same embodied and accountable social action. Social structures require continued acceptance and confirmation to continue. In such duality, structure and action are inseparable as “knowledgeable” human agents of sex, gender, and sexual practices enact social structures by reflexively putting into practice their structured knowledge. Social structures are the “medium” and “outcome” of social action: *medium* because it is through the use of social structures that social action occurs and *outcome* because it is through social action that social structures are reproduced—and sometimes transformed—in time and space (Giddens 1976; Mouzelis 2008). Because agents reflexively “do” sex, gender, and sexuality in specific socially structured situations, they reproduce social structures. And given that agents often reproduce sex, gender, and sexual ideals in socially structured specific practices, there are a variety of ways to do them. Within specific social structural settings, particular forms of sex, gender, and sexual practices are available, encouraged, and permitted. Accordingly, sexed, gendered, and sexual *agency* must be viewed as reflexive and embodied structured action—what people, and therefore bodies, do under specific social structural constraints and enablements (Messerschmidt 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016).

Although a variety of social structures exist, two are especially salient for conceptualizing sex, gender, and sexuality and thus masculinities and crime: relational and discursive. *Relational* social structures establish through social practice the interconnections and interdependence among individuals in particular social settings and thus define social relationships among people in terms of sex, gender, and sexuality. Relational social structures constrain and enable social action. Examples of relational social structures are the informal yet unequal network of sexed, gendered, and sexual “cliques” in elementary and secondary schools and the sex and gender divisions of labor within workplaces. *Discursive* social structures are representations, ideas, and sign systems (language) that produce culturally significant meanings. Discursive social structures establish through social practice orders of “truth” and what is accepted as “reality” in particular situations. Like relational social structures, discursive social structures constrain and enable the possibilities of social action. Examples of discursive social structures are the notion of “two and only two sexes” mentioned above and social conventions defining styles of dress in terms of sex, gender, and sexuality.

Relational and discursive social structures intersect and work in combination and jointly, but also at times contradictorily. Both relational and discursive social structures are actualized only through particular forms of social

action—they have a material base—yet such structured action produces simultaneously particular social relations *and* social meanings that are culturally significant because they shape a sense of what is “acceptable” and “unacceptable” behavior for copresent interactants in specific situations. Through embodied social action individuals produce relational social structures that concurrently proffer meaningful representations (through embodied appearance and practices) for others as a consequence of their social action. And in turn, through embodied social action individuals also produce discursive social structures that concurrently constitute social relations (through representations, ideas, and sign systems) for others as a consequence of their social action. In other words, discursive social structures often are a part of relational social structures and the latter often are a component of the former. The intersection of relational and discursive social structures then construct the knowledge we use to engage in particular practices—they recursively constrain and enable social action—and they actualize specific forms of understandings that define what is normal, acceptable, and deviant in particular social situations.

Nevertheless, relational and discursive social structures are not all-encompassing determinants and are not always accepted by agents without question or objection (Mouzelis 2008). Through reflexivity agents actually may distance and separate themselves from particular social structures, clearing the path for improvisation and innovation in social action. For example, when confronting social structures agents at times engage in reflexive internal deliberations and may decide to break from and analyze, investigate, and possibly resist situational structural constraints and enablements (Mouzelis 2008). As Abby Peterson (2011) shows, it is in reflexivity where we find the mediatory processes whereby structure and action are connected or disconnected. And when such disconnect of agent from structure transpires—and thus *dualism* rather than *duality* occurs—the result often is unique forms of social action.

Furthermore, social action may also be influenced by forms of knowledge as *supplemental* constraints and enablements, which are nonrecurring (because they do not transcend time and space) and thus nonstructural. Examples of supplemental constraints and enablements are specific types of social interaction, such as a one-time intimate conversation with a trusted and influential individual, as well as our bodies, because the body changes over time and situationally constrains and enables social action. In short, sex, gender, and sexual social action emerge from, and are constrained and enabled by, what is always possible within any particular social situation. We are now in the position to discuss more thoroughly the common yet fluid configuration of hegemonic masculine practices.

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITIES

Power is an important structural feature of sex, gender, and sexual relations. Socially structured power relations among men and women are constructed historically on the bases of sex, gender, and sexual preference. In other words, in specific contexts some men and some women have greater power than other men or other women; some genders have greater power than other genders; some sexualities have greater power than other sexualities; and the capacity to exercise power and do sex, gender, and sexuality is, for the most part, a reflection of one's place in sex, gender, and sexual structured relations of power. Consequently, in general heterosexual men and women exercise greater power than do gay men, lesbians, and other sexual minorities; upper-class men and women exercise greater power than do working-class men and women; and white men and women exercise greater power than do racial minority men and women. Power, then, is a relationship that structures social interaction not only between men and women but also among men and among women as well as in terms of gender and sexuality. Nevertheless, power is not absolute and at times may actually shift in relation to different axes of power and powerlessness.

Gender hegemony of course involves a power relation, and I define "hegemonic masculinity" as those masculinities that *legitimate* an unequal *relationship* between men and women, masculinity and femininity, and among masculinities. The emphasis on *hegemony* and thus legitimation underscores the achievement of hegemonic masculinity through cultural influence and discursive persuasion, encouraging consent and compliance—rather than direct control and commands—to unequal gender relations. Hegemonic masculine configurations of practice then construct both relational and discursive social structures because they establish relations of sex and gender inequality and at once signify discursively acceptable understandings of sex and gender relations.

In this regard, I find that Mimi Schippers's (2007) work is significant because it opens an extremely useful approach of conceptualizing how such *legitimacy* in hegemonic masculinity transpires. Schippers argues that embedded within the meanings of structured gendered relationships are the "qualities members of each gender category should and are assumed to possess"; therefore, it is in "the idealized *quality content* of the categories 'man' and 'woman' that we find the hegemonic significance of masculinity and femininity" (90). For Schippers, certain masculine characteristics *legitimate* men's power over women "only when they are symbolically paired with a complementary and inferior quality attached to femininity" (91). The significance of hegemonic forms of masculinity, then, is found in discursive meanings that legitimate a rationale for structured social relations and that ensure the ascendancy and power of men as well as specific masculinities. What

Schippers highlights, therefore, is first the *relationship* between masculinity and femininity and second how a certain masculinity is hegemonic only when it articulates discursively particular *gender qualities* that are *complementary* and *hierarchical* in relation to specific feminine qualities. For example, such a complementary and hierarchical relationship might establish masculinity as constituting physical strength, the ability to use interpersonal violence in the face of conflict, and authority, whereas femininity would embrace physical vulnerability, an inability to use violence effectively, and compliance (91). When both masculine and feminine qualities legitimate a complementary and hierarchical relationship between them, we have *hegemonic masculinity*, involving unequal gender relations or the superordinate position of men and subordinate position of women (94).

This concentration on *gendered quality content* empirically enables investigating multiple forms of hegemonic masculinity because *whenever a complementary and hierarchical relationship between masculinity and femininity exists, gender hegemony prevails*. To be sure, “gendered quality content” does *not* mean “fixed character traits,” but rather it means changing *relational* attributes in sundry historical and social situations. To be sure, through the construction of hegemonic masculinities and thus unequal gender relations, situational notions of “man” and “woman” embody culturally defined “superior” and “inferior” gendered qualities, respectively, that in turn establish consequential masculinities and femininities for copresent interactants.

Where I part from Schippers is in her argument that there exists “neither pariah masculinities nor subordinate masculinities,” because “masculinity must always remain superior; it must never be conflated with something undesirable” (96). Schippers makes this point when discussing, *exclusively*, men who embody culturally defined *feminine* qualities (i.e., having erotic desire for men; seemingly weak, ineffectual, and compliant), yet ignoring those men who embody “toxic” masculine qualities. In other words, Schippers’s perspective fails to account for masculine *relationships* based similarly on differing gendered qualities attached to each and that *legitimate* a hierarchical relationship between two different types of masculinities. Although the application of *quality content* to discern gender hegemony discursively is significant, I extend Schippers’s conception of gender hegemony to include *gendered qualities* that establish and legitimate a hierarchical (but not necessarily complementary) relationship to nonhegemonic masculinities.

Hegemonic masculinities form a relational and discursive social structure that has cultural influence but do not determine social action. Hegemonic masculinities often—but not always—underpin the conventions applied in the enactment and reproduction of masculinities (and femininities)—the lived embodied patterns of meanings, which as they are experienced as practice, appear as reciprocally confirming. Hegemonic masculinities relationally and discursively shape a sense of “reality” for men and women in specific

situations and are continually renewed, recreated, defended, and modified through social action. And yet they are at times resisted, limited, altered, and challenged.

The diversity and wide variety of hegemonic masculinities operate as components of this social structure, constituting recurring “on-hand” meaningful practices and discourses that are culturally influential and thus available to be actualized into social action in a range of different circumstances. Gender hegemony, then, is essentially *decentered*; there exists not one or a few hegemonic masculinities, but rather hegemonic masculinities are multifarious and found in a whole variety of settings—locally, regionally, and globally. Hegemonic masculinities do not discriminate in terms of race/ethnicity, class, age, sexuality, and nationality, and hegemonic masculinities do not represent a certain *type* of man; instead they personify and symbolize an unequal *relationship* between men and women, masculinity and femininity, and among masculinities that is widely dispersed and operates intimately and diffusely. And these copious hegemonic masculinities provide a conceptual framework that is materialized in the design of daily practices, interactions, and discourses. As individuals construct hegemonic masculinities they simultaneously present those unequal gender relations as culturally significant for others as a consequence of their embodied social action. Gendered power, then, is both “top down” and “disciplinary” (Foucault 1979), and constituted through acceptance of, and consent to, hegemonically masculine forms of meanings, knowledge, and practice that are ubiquitous locally, regionally, and globally, yet simultaneously they are hidden in plain sight—this is indeed bona fide hegemony.

In addition to the above, the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity underpins what has become known as *heteronormativity*, or the legal, cultural, organizational, and interpersonal practices that derive from and reinforce the discursive structure that there are two and only two naturally opposite and complementary sexes (male and female), that gender is a natural manifestation of sex (masculinity and femininity), and that it is natural for the two opposite and complementary sexes to be sexually attracted to each other (heterosexuality). In other words, the social construction of sex differences intersects with the assumption of gender and sexual complementarity, or the notion that men’s and women’s bodies are naturally compatible and thus “made for each other”—the “natural” sex act allegedly involves vaginal penetration by a penis (Jackson and Scott 2010). Heterosexuality is understood culturally as the natural erotic attraction to sex/gender difference, as well as a natural practice of male active dominance and female passive receptivity, and thus this notion of “natural attraction and practice” reinforces hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity as innate, complementary, and hierarchical opposites (Schippers 2007). Heteronormativity therefore refers to “the myriad ways in which heterosexuality is produced as

a natural, unproblematic, taken-for-granted, ordinary phenomenon” (Kitzinger 2005, 478).

Accordingly, there is nothing “natural” about heterosexuality, and indeed the term “heterosexuality” actually did not appear until the 1890s, and then it was used to specifically designate an identity based not on procreation but rather on sexual desire for the opposite sex. Heterosexuality became disconnected from procreation, and “normal” sexuality was henceforth defined as heterosexual attraction; “abnormal” sexuality was homosexual attraction. The concept of heterosexuality was defined in terms of its relationship to the concept of homosexuality, both terms categorizing a sexual desire unrelated to procreation, and individuals now began to define their sexual identity according to whether they were attracted to the same or the opposite sex. And Steven Seidman articulates well the historically constructed close connection between gender and heterosexuality:

There can be no norm of heterosexuality, indeed no notion of heterosexuality, without assuming two genders that are coherent as a relationship of opposition and unity. If there were no fixed categories of gender, if there were no “men” and “women,” there could be no concept of heterosexuality! So, heterosexuality is anchored by maintaining a gender order through either celebrating and idealizing gender or by stigmatizing and polluting gender nonconformity. (2010, 158)

Gender hegemony and sexual hegemony intersect so that both masculinity and heterosexuality are deemed superior and femininity and homosexuality (and alternative sexualities) are judged to be inferior. The social construction of men and women as naturally different, complementary, and hierarchical sanctions heterosexuality as *the* normal and natural form of sexuality and masculine men and feminine women as *the* normal and natural gender presentation; any sexual or gender construction outside of these dichotomies is considered problematic.

Heteronormativity then reproduces a sexual social structure based on an unequal sexual binary—heterosexuality and homosexuality—and that is dependent upon the alleged natural sexual attraction of two and only two opposite and complementary sexes that in turn constructs heteromale and heterofemale difference. Nevertheless, some heterosexual practices are more powerful than other heterosexual practices; that is, normative heterosexuality determines its own social structure and thus internal boundaries as well as marginalizing and sanctioning sexualities outside those boundaries.

In addition to sexuality, structured action theory emphasizes the construction of race, class, age, and nationality as situated social, interactional, variable, and embodied accomplishments that are coconstituted with hegemonic masculinities. In other words, race, class, age, and nationality grow out of embodied social practices in specific unequal structural settings and serve to

inform such practices episodically in reciprocal relation. The key to understanding the maintenance of existing race, class, age, and nationality social inequalities—and as intersecting with hegemonic masculinities—is the accomplishment of such practices through reflexive embodied social interaction. Social actors perpetuate and sometimes transform inequalities and structures through their social action, and these inequalities and structures constrain and enable race, class, age, nationality, and hegemonically masculine social actions. The result is the ongoing social construction of hegemonic masculinities as variably constituted by unequal race, class, age, and nationality relations. In other words, the significance of each accomplishment to particular hegemonic masculinities is socially situated and thus intermittent.

NONHEGEMONIC MASCULINITIES AND FEMININITIES

In addition to variable intersection of hegemonic masculinities with race, class, age, sexuality, and nationality, structured action theory identifies distinct nonhegemonic masculinities: dominant, dominating, subordinate, and positive. *Dominant* masculinities and femininities differ from hegemonic masculinities and emphasized femininities in that they are not always associated with and linked to gender hegemony but refer fundamentally to the most celebrated, common, or current form of masculinity and femininity in a particular social setting. *Dominating* masculinities and femininities are similar to dominant masculinities and femininities but differ in the sense that they involve commanding and controlling specific interactions and exercising power and control over people and events—“calling the shots” and “running the show.” Dominant and dominating masculinities and femininities do not necessarily legitimate a hierarchical relationship between men and women, masculinity and femininity. Although hegemonic masculinities and emphasized femininities at times may also be dominant or dominating, dominant and dominating masculinities and femininities are never hegemonic or emphasized if they fail culturally to *legitimate* unequal gender relations; in this latter scenario, dominant and dominating masculinities/femininities are thereby constructed *outside* relations of gender hegemony. However, dominant and dominating masculinities and femininities necessarily acquire meaning only in relation to other masculinities and femininities (Messerschmidt 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016).

Dominant and dominating masculinities and femininities exhibit different logics and degrees of power. For masculinities in particular, dominant masculinities may construct, for instance, celebratory power while dominating masculinities fashion commanding and controlling power; neither in and of itself orchestrates hegemonic masculine power. Although it is true that hege-

monic masculinities may not always be dominant and dominating in the above sense, the reverse also holds true: in addition to their legitimating influence (which is essential), hegemonic masculinities may concurrently be socially dominant and/or dominating. It is crucial therefore to leave open investigative room for empirical exploration as to when, how, and under what particular social conditions hegemonic masculinities are simultaneously dominant and/or dominating, and when they are not.

Subordinate masculinities and femininities refer to those masculinities and femininities situationally constructed as lesser than or aberrant and deviant to hegemonic masculinity or emphasized femininity as well as dominant/dominating masculinities and femininities. Depending upon the particular context, such subordination can be conceptualized in terms of, for example, race, class, age, sexualities, or nationality. Although homophobia has likely diminished somewhat in recent years in global North societies, it clearly has not disappeared. And given the discussion above in this chapter, it should be obvious that a form of subordination is that of gay boys/men and lesbian girls/women—still today, frequently the former are culturally feminized and the latter culturally masculinized. In a gender and heteronormative hegemonic culture, then, gayness continues to be socially defined in many contexts as the embodiment of whatever is expelled from hegemonic masculinity, and lesbianism is the embodiment of whatever is expelled from emphasized femininity.

Related to this, a second form of subordination usually occurs if there exists *incongruence* within the sex-gender-heterosexuality interconnection. For example, girls and women perceived as female who construct “incongruent” bodily practices defined as masculine, such as expressing sexual desire for girls (“dyke”), acting sexually promiscuous (“slut”), and/or presenting as authoritarian, physically aggressive, or take charge (“bitch”) are viewed as polluting “normal” and “natural” hegemonic gender and sexual relations and often are verbally, socially, and physically subordinated (Schippers 2007). Similarly, individuals perceived as male but who construct “incongruent” bodily practices defined as feminine, such as sexually desiring boys or simply practicing celibacy (“fag”), being passive, compliant, or shy (“sissy”), and/or being physically weak or unadventurous (“wimp”) likewise are seen as polluting “normal” and “natural” hegemonic gender and sexual relations and often are verbally, socially, and physically subordinated. Social structures that actualize unequal gender and sexual relations, then, are sustained in part through the subordination of the above genders and sexualities.

Finally, subordination can also occur among individuals that construct situationally accountable masculinities and femininities. For example, the masculinity of a son may be judged to be subordinate to the *dominant* masculinity of his father, and the femininity of a daughter may be considered subordinate to the *dominant* femininity of her mother. Both of these are

subordinate primarily by reason of age, not because of any incongruence between sex and gender, and usually are established and thus practiced independent of gender hegemony.

Positive masculinities and femininities are those that legitimate an egalitarian relationship between men and women, between masculinity and femininity, and among masculinities and femininities, and therefore are constructed exterior to gender hegemonic relational and discursive structures in any particular setting. Such masculinities and femininities do not assume a normal and natural relationship to sex and sexuality and usually are not constructed as naturally complementary.

Structured action theory permits investigation of the different ways men and women experience their everyday worlds from their particular positions in society and how they relate to other men and women; the embodied hegemonic practices variably intersect and are constituted by race, class, age, sexuality, and nationality, and are associated with the specific context of individual action and are for the most part self-regulated—through reflexivity—within that context; social actors self-regulate their behavior and make specific reflexive choices in specific socially structured contexts. In this way, then, men and women construct varieties of hegemonic masculinities and thus unequal gender relations through specific embodied practices. And by emphasizing diversity in hegemonic masculine construction, we achieve a more fluid and situated approach to our understanding of embodied gender hegemony and eventually masculinities and crime.

EMBODIMENT

As I have emphasized, constructing sex, gender, and sexuality entails *embodied* social practices—reflexive structured action. Only through our bodies do we experience the social world, and the very possibility of a social world rests upon our embodiment (Crossley 2001). As Iris Marion Young long ago pointed out:

It is the body in its orientation toward and action upon and within its surroundings that constitutes the initial meaning-given act. The body is the first locus of intentionality, as pure presence to the world and openness upon its possibilities. The most primordial intentional act is the motion of the body orienting itself with respect to and moving within its surroundings. (1990, 147–48)

We understand the world from our embodied place in it and our perceptual awareness of situational surrounding space. The body is a sensuous being—it perceives, it touches, and it feels; it is a lived body, and given that consciousness consists of perceptual sensations, it is therefore part of the body and not a separate substance (Crossley 2001). The mind and the body

are inseparably linked—a binary divide is a fiction—and live together as one in the social construction of masculinities and femininities. In this conceptualization, then, the body forms the whole of our being and, therefore, one's reflexive self is located in the body, which in turn acts, and is acted upon, within a social environment. And in contemporary industrialized societies the body is central to the social construction of self (Giddens 1991). A proficient and able body is necessary for social action and, therefore, embodied discipline is fundamental to the competent social agent: "It is integral to the very nature both of agency and of being accepted (trusted) by others as competent" (100).

Related to the above is Pat Martin's (2003) differentiation between "gender practices" and "practicing gender." The term "gender practices" refers to forms of embodied behavior that are structurally "available" in specific social settings for individuals "to enact in an encounter or situation in accord with (or in violation of) the gender institution" (354). In other words, these are potential, situationally available embodied structured actions and discourses "that people know about and have the capacity or agency to do, assert, perform, or mobilize" (354). The term "practicing gender" entails actually "doing" the situationally available gendered practices and is usually reflexively accomplished with copresent interactants. To do gender reflexively individuals must "carefully consider the content of one's actions and act only after careful consideration of the intent, content, and effects of one's behavior" (356). Although we make reflexive choices to act in particular ways, that reflexivity is based on the situationally embodied gender practices associated with contextual relational and discursive social structures.

Through embodied social action, then, individuals "do" masculinities and femininities while simultaneously reproducing structures and presenting such practices as resources for others as a consequence of their embodiment. The social situations in which embodied actions are oriented "are populated by others and it is these others, in part, towards whom the actions are oriented. Action is other oriented" (Crossley 1995, 141). Embodied social action is embedded within the specific social structural context of the agent, so that what we actually conceptualize are social situations that require specific "practical accommodation from our action" (136)—we reflexively respect, acknowledge, reproduce, and sometimes resist structured embodied practices. And as Goffman acutely observes, such embodied actions are situational forms of "social portraiture" in which individuals discursively convey information that "the others in the gathering will need in order to manage their own courses of action—which knowledgeability he [*sic*] in turn must count on in carrying out his [*sic*] own designs" (1979, 6). Doing masculinity and femininity therefore is necessarily both reflexive and physical; it is intelligent, meaningful, and embodied.

Bodies are active in the production and transmission of social structures as well as embodied social actions, and are based on the reaction of others to our embodiment—whether or not it is judged accountable is important to our sense of self. Embodied accountability is vital to an individual's situational recognition as a competent social agent. If one's embodied appearance and practice are categorized by others as “failed,” that degradation may result in a spoiled self-concept and identity (Goffman 1968). Consequently, adequate participation in social life depends upon the successful presenting, monitoring, and interpreting of bodies.

Goffman helps us understand how constructing masculinities and femininities are socially structured in the sense that we accomplish each bodily and in a manner that is accountable to situationally populated others. Individuals exhibit embodied masculine and feminine competence through their appearance and by producing situationally appropriate “behavioral styles” that respond properly to the styles produced by others. In other words, “competent” individuals develop an embodied capacity to provide and to read structured depictions of masculinities and femininities in particular settings, and appropriate body management is crucial to the smooth flow of interaction essential to satisfactory attribution and accountability by others. To be “read” by others as male, female, masculine, feminine, straight, gay, lesbian, etc., individuals must ensure that their proffered selves are maintained through situationally appropriate display and behavior—the body is social, and social settings are created through intercorporeality.

But in addition, properly accountable bodies construct relational and discursive social structures and they signal and facilitate through their appearance and action the maintenance of hegemonic masculine power dynamics. Suitably adorned and comported bodies constitute the “shadow and the substance” of unequal gender relations (Goffman 1979, 6): “The expression of subordination and domination through the swarm of situational means is more than a mere tracing of symbol or ritualistic affirmation of social hierarchy. These expressions considerably constitute the hierarchy; they are the shadow and the substance.” Individuals produce (and at times challenge) hegemonically masculine relations through their embodied appearance and actions.

The body is an essential part of masculine and feminine construction in which we fashion appearance and actions to create properly and situationally adorned and performed bodies. The body is an inescapable and integral part of doing gender, entailing social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what bodies do; it is not social practice reduced to the body (Connell 2000). Constructing hegemonic masculinities involves a dialectical relationship in which practice deals with the biological characteristics of bodies: “It gives them a social determination. The connection between social and natural structures is one of practical relevance, not causation” (Connell 1987, 78). In

the social construction of masculinities and femininities, then, bodily similarities between men and women are negated and suppressed, whereas bodily differences are exaggerated. The body is essential to, for example, the discourse of “two and only two sexes” in the sense that “men have penises and women do not.” The body is significant for our fundamental projects discussed at the beginning of this chapter, our sense of self that we subjectively sustain through time and space. Bodies impact our recurring self-attributions and thus one’s identity as male or female, masculine or feminine, straight or gay, etc. Because “sex” is associated with genitalia there is likely to be a degree of social standardization of individual lives—we recursively construct ourselves as, for example, a “boy/man” or as a “girl/woman” with a particular sexual orientation and thus such identities constrain and enable our social action. For most people sex is the primary claimed identity that is relatively solid and unchanging while gender and sexuality are qualifiers to sex (Paechter 2006). Nevertheless, some turn this on its head—such as certain transgender people—whereby sex is the qualifier and gender is the primary mode in which one relates to the world (259).

Bodies participate in social action by delineating courses of social conduct: bodies are agents of social practice and, given the context, will do certain things and not others; our bodies are *supplemental* constraints and enablers of social action and therefore they situationally mediate and influence social practices (Connell 1995a). The body often is lived in terms of what it can “do” and the “consequence of bodily practice is historicity: the creation and transformation of situations. Bodies are drawn into history and history is constituted through bodies” (Connell 1998, 7). In short, the body is a participant in the shaping and generating of masculine and feminine social practice and thus unequal gender relations—it is impossible to consider human agency and masculinities and crime without taking sexed, gendered, and sexual embodiment into account.

CHALLENGES

Nevertheless, certain occasions present themselves as more effectively intimidating for demonstrating and affirming embodied gender. In certain situations individuals may experience body betrayal and be identified by others as embodying gender “failure.” The constitution of masculinities and femininities through bodily appearance and performance means that sex and gender accountability are vulnerable when the situationally and socially structured appropriate appearance and performance are not (for whatever reason) sustained. Because the taken-for-granted sex and gender of individuals can be challenged in certain contexts, each may become particularly salient. They are, as David Morgan would put it, “more or less explicitly put on the line”

(1992, 47), and the responding social action can generate an intensified reflexivity and a distinct type of gender construction. Such challenges are contextually embodied interactions that result in, for example, sex, gender, or sexual degradation—the individual is constructed as a “deviant” member of society. Such challenges arise from interactional threats and insults from peers, teachers, parents, or workmates and from situationally and bodily defined expectations that are not achievable. Challenges, then, in various ways, proclaim a man or boy or a woman or girl subordinate in contextually defined embodied terms. Such challenges may motivate social action toward specific situationally embodied practices that attempt to correct the subordinating social situation (Messerschmidt 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). Given that such interactions question, undermine, and/or threaten one’s sex, gender, or sexuality, only contextually “appropriate” embodied practices can help overcome the challenge. The existence of challenges alerts us to the transitory and fleeting nature of sex and gender construction—including hegemonic masculinities—and to how particular forms of social action may arise as gendered practices when they are regularly threatened and contested.

CONCLUSION

Social action is never simply an autonomous event but is amalgamated into larger assemblages, which are labeled here as socially structured embodied actions. The socially structured situational practices encourage specific lines of social action, and relational and discursive social structures shape the capacities from which social actions are constructed over time. Men and boys and women and girls negotiate the situations that face them in everyday life and in the process pursue, for example, a sex, gender, and sexuality project. From this perspective, then, social action is often—but not always—designed with an eye to one’s sex, gender, and sexual accountability individually, bodily, situationally, and structurally. Structured action theory, then, permits us to explore how and in what respects masculine and feminine embodied practices and thus unequal gender relations are constituted in certain settings at certain times. To understand the multifarious masculinities and crime discussed in this book, we must appreciate how structure and action are woven inextricably into the ongoing reflexive activities of constructing embodied unequal gender relations.

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[18]

'There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches': Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training

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This article draws on participant observation in a law enforcement academy to demonstrate how a hidden curriculum encourages aspects of hegemonic masculinity among recruits. Academy training teaches female and male recruits that masculinity is an essential requirement for the practice of policing and that women do not belong. By watching and learning from instructors and each other, male students developed a form of masculinity that (1) excluded women students and exaggerated differences between them and men; and (2) denigrated women in general. Thus, the masculinity that is characteristic of police forces and is partly responsible for women's low representation on them is not produced exclusively on the job, but is taught in police academies as a subtext of professional socialization.

Keywords: masculinity, police, gender, work culture, sexual harassment, hidden curriculum

Law enforcement training instructors often showed us episodes of the television show *COPS* as a teaching tool. In one episode, the cops arrested a shirtless man after his girlfriend had called the police. Angry at being arrested, the man yelled out, 'There oughtta be a law against bitches!' Our classroom exploded in laughter. For the remaining four months of training, when students wanted to joke about something a woman trainee had done or about women in general, they would exclaim, 'There oughtta be a law against bitches.' I estimate that I heard the phrase 25 times or more. To me, it came to epitomize the way many men recruits felt about women becoming police officers with them; women simply did not belong. (Excerpt from field notes)

Introduction

Recent theories of gender in organizations focus on the logic and processes that sustain the gender status quo (Acker, 1990, 1999a; Connell, 1987; Scott, 1986). More specifically, gender operates in organizations through several interacting processes: the construction of divisions along gender lines, the construction of symbols that reinforce those divisions, interactions between groups that produce gendered social structures, and, as outcomes of these processes, the production of gendered components of individual identity and of a gendered frame for understanding other social structures (Acker, 1990; see also Scott, 1986). Workplaces are a key site of such operations, where a seemingly gender-neutral organizational logic embeds gendered assumptions and practices deeply into the fabric of modern work.

Workers, not just work organizations, are complicit in gender creation, as ethnographic research shows, although asymmetries of power between women and men mean that they do not necessarily contribute equally to the definition of gender that prevails in a situation (Barrett, 1996; Britton, 1997; Chetkovich, 1997; Collinson, 1992; Collinson and Collinson, 1989; DiTomaso, 1989; Leidner, 1991; P. Martin, 1996, 2001; Ogasawara, 1998; Pierce, 1995; Williams, 1995; Willis, 1977). P. Martin (1998a, p. 324) explains the importance of 'framing men as agents who actively create gender hierarchy at work' (see also Collinson and Hearn, 1996; P. Martin, 2001), and Collinson and Hearn (1994, p. 5) speak of the need to 'make "men" and "masculinity" explicit [and] to talk of men's power'. Yet, as Reskin (2000) notes, much gendering is based on unconscious tendencies and need not be motivated by hostility (see also Jackman, 1994; Scott, 1990).

This article investigates a cultural practice — the creation of masculinity in police academy training — that may be implicated in a structural outcome — the low representation of women on US police forces (13.3% in 1997; National Center for Women in Policing, 1999). Police academy training represents recruits' first formal encounter with a police organization and is the first step in their professional socialization. We argue that in addition to the formal curriculum, which covers the procedures, policies, and practices of being an officer, police academies also teach the lessons of an informal 'hidden curriculum' (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; K. Martin, 1998) about masculinity. This curriculum, taught obliquely by teachers and students, instructs students about the particular form of masculinity that is lauded in police culture, the relationship between extreme masculinity and police work, and the nature of the groups that fall 'inside' and 'outside' of the culture of policing.

Because much research has shown that masculinity construction is largely an enterprise undertaken by men, why do we examine how the presence of women affects masculinity construction? In the masculinity-construction drama through which men must show to themselves, and to

other men, that they conform to the dictates of appropriate masculinity, women are usually regarded as mere bit players. It is other men, not women, who put their imprimatur on appropriate masculinity (Bird, 1996, pp. 127–8; Cockburn, 1991). According to Kimmel (1994, p. 129), 'We test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks, all because we want other men to grant us our manhood.' However, we argue that women's presence can reveal much. Masculinity is rendered most visible in situations where it is challenged, as when men face unemployment, enter traditionally female occupations (Brandth, 1998; Morgan, 1992; Williams, 1995), or, as in this case, when women enter jobs that traditionally had been used to confirm masculinity (Cockburn, 1991; Gerson and Peiss, 1985; Padavic, 1991). Thus, rather than showing that masculinity exists, we believe that studying what happens when women enter police academy training may provide insights into the *process* of masculinity construction.

While men may prefer single-sex work groups (see P. Martin, 2001), they are not always possible, and in such cases women's presence can further the masculine project in two ways. First, women can be used as a foil, allowing masculinity to be defined by what it is not. As Gamson (1997, p. 181) noted, the process of establishing a collective identity requires difference. Merely highlighting commonalities is not enough; marking off 'who we are not' is equally necessary (Barrett, 1996). As we show below, academy women became tools in the construction of boundaries that delineated who was 'in' and who was 'out' (P. Martin, 2001), in large part by making much of gender differences or creating them when they were not there. Second, women's presence can be used to elevate men's status. Devaluing women is equally as important a task as demarcating them as 'other'. As Cockburn (1988, p. 223) pointed out, the masculine identity concerns that men partly resolve by highlighting differences between the sexes inevitably produce inequality. More generally, Reskin (1988) argued that differentiation is the basis for devaluation in hierarchical systems. In this research we show that men students and instructors reinforced notions that men were superior to women in the police academy, on police forces, and in society more generally.

This is not to imply that men are the only institutional actors. A companion piece (Prokos, n.d.) shows that women did not respond uniformly to academy training. Women's responses ranged from capitalizing on stereotypical femininity, to trying to fit in with the masculine culture of the organization, to rejecting ideas about policing that equated competence with masculinity. Other researchers have documented policewomen's attitudes, identity construction, and the tension women police face between femininity and the dictates of police work (e.g. Brewer, 1991; Coffey, Brown and Savage, 1992; S. Martin, 1980). Thus, while women are more than foils or victims, the data analyzed here center on men's, not women's, actions.

Masculinity and policing

Masculinity is a social construction reproduced through everyday interactions. Its quality as a social construction rather than as a property of individual men can be seen in this definition by Kerfoot and Knights (1996, p. 86): 'the socially generated consensus of what it means to be a man, to be "manly" or to display such behaviour at any one time'. Multiple forms of masculinity exist because men (and women) construct masculinity in particular social and historical contexts. In contemporary Western society, however, 'hegemonic masculinity' (Connell, 1995) is the dominant form for reinforcing men's power on the cultural and collective levels. Although hegemonic masculinity takes different forms (Burris, 1996; P. Martin, 1998b), it is generally defined through work in the paid labor force, subordination of women, heterosexism, uncontrollable sexuality, authority, control, competitive individualism, independence, aggressiveness, and capacity for violence (Connell, 1995; Messerschmidt, 1996).

Hegemonic masculinity is a central defining concept in the culture of police work in the United States. Male police officers have drawn on images of a 'masculine cop' to enhance their sense of masculinity and to resist women's growing presence (Martin and Jurik, 1996). Hunt (1984, 1990) contended that the policeman's symbolic world is one of opposing qualities directly related to gender. Male officers equate women with feminine moral virtue, the domestic realm, social service, formal rules, administration, cleanliness, and emotions. In contrast, they equate men and masculinity with guns, crimefighting, a combative personality, resistance to management, fights, weapons, and a desire to work in high crime areas (Hunt, 1990). Thus, it is no surprise that many male police officers strongly believe that women are incapable of being good police officers.

Police officers — both managers and rank-and-file officers — share a myth of policing as action-filled, exciting, adventurous, and dangerous (Brown *et al.*, 1993). The reality of police work, however, involves much tedium and paperwork and relatively little crime fighting or violence. Regardless of the reality, male police officers cling to the image of police officers as crime fighters and downplay the femininely labeled aspects of the job, such as paperwork and social service (Hunt, 1990). Women's presence and competent performance of the masculine aspects of the job mean that the job can no longer be enlisted straightforwardly in the project of confirming masculinity. Another factor that influences male supervisors' and co-workers' responses to women cops is fear of exposure. Because women are both 'outsiders' and stereotyped as moral, male supervisors anticipate that women will expose corruption, and male rank-and-file officers anticipate that women will expose excessive violence or extramarital (or on-duty) sex (Hunt, 1990).

The first line of defense when women attempt to gain a foothold in a male preserve, thus challenging its masculine status, is to try to stop the invasion. Indeed, research shows many examples of resistance from superiors and co-workers to women's presence on police forces. Unduly harsh treatment from supervisors is common. For example, one trainer forbade a woman trainee from going to the bathroom or talking to other officers while on patrol for the first three months of her training (Heidensohn, 1992), and another sent a female officer out alone to patrol a high-crime area after she complained of unfair treatment (Feinman, 1994). Rank-and-file officers have resisted and demeaned women co-workers through their use of language and through sexual harassment. The offensive use of profanity (Morash and Haarr, 1995), the use of anti-women remarks, refusal to speak to women altogether (Balkin, 1988), and the use of affectionate terms of address such as 'hon' and 'sweetheart' (Martin and Jurik, 1996) are common. Innuendoes about women officers' sexuality, typically by referring to them as 'whores' or 'dykes', are widespread (Heidensohn, 1992; Hunt, 1984, 1990). Finally, male co-workers sexually harass women on and off duty. 'Women find sex magazines, dildos, and vibrators in their lockers and mailboxes; they encounter betting pools on who will be the first to have sex with a new female officer' (Martin and Jurik, 1996, p. 38). If this first line of defense does not succeed in eliminating women from the occupation, women's threat to the masculine character of the job can be mitigated if they can be segregated into the non-masculine, paperwork-dominated, aspects of the job, thus preserving the masculine character of the crime-fighting policeman (Hunt, 1990). If segregation is not possible, a third alternative is to use women's presence to confirm the masculine nature of the job by showing women to be unfit for it.

These elements of resistance on the part of supervisors and co-workers may have developed spontaneously in police departments. It is possible, however, that officer training programs sowed the seeds of these resistance behaviors, a possibility that we investigate here. If so, then the culture of masculinity encouraged by academy training (and further encouraged on police forces) can limit opportunities of women officers and help explain the persistent under-representation of women cops.

The hidden curriculum

In its general form, the term 'hidden curriculum' refers to the lessons schools teach students that go beyond the explicit curriculum (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). This concept originated among scholars examining the role of the schools in reproducing social class across generations. They found that schools endorse orientations that correspond to the needs of employers, such as the importance and naturalness of hierarchy and obedience (Bowles

and Gintis, 1976; Giroux and Purpel, 1983). Gender scholars have recently applied the idea of a hidden curriculum to the reproduction of gender inequality (Addelston and Stirratt, 1996; K. Martin, 1998). They have pointed out that hidden curricula are crucial to the construction of gender, as schools teach and enforce what it means to be masculine and feminine and how to behave masculinely and femininely. Although research on police academy training has shown that recruits learn unrecognized and unintentional lessons during academy training (Harris, 1973), the gendered dimension of such lessons is unknown.

The setting

Certification is the first step toward establishing a law enforcement career in the United States. Police academies teach the nuts and bolts of being a police officer: here recruits practise shooting, defensive tactics, patrol-car driving, and first aid, as well as learn about state and federal law, investigations, and patrolling. Most instructors are sworn police officers from local and state law enforcement agencies, and most students and instructors are men (S. Martin, 1994; Martin and Jurik, 1996; Pike, 1992).

Because this research investigates only one academy, which is located in a rural county in the southeastern USA, the findings may not be generalizable to urban academies or to ones in other regions. Despite the academy's rural location, however, its students came from a nearby mid-sized city and almost all had graduated from one of the city's two universities; thus the student body is not exceptional on the rural/urban dimension. Residents of the south tend to hold more conservative gender attitudes (although they have become more liberal over time, see Rice and Coates, 1995), and thus we cannot make claims about the national representativeness of this study. We note, however, that while geographically limited ethnographic research cannot be considered definitive, it can add to our understanding by illustrating the processes by which women and men students learn about masculinity on police forces.

Methodology

This research is based on participant observation the first author conducted in 1997 while enrolled in a law enforcement training academy program lasting five months. She is a white woman, 27 years old at the time of the research. The other 30 students were mostly white men in their early twenties who held bachelor's degrees. There were four other women in the class, all white, and three African-American men. Of the more than 40 instructors who taught classes at various times, about 12% were women, one

of whom was African-American. The academy course met eight hours a day, five days a week. Most students paid the \$1000 tuition themselves, but a few were sponsored by a local police department.

Because this article is based on the participant observation of the first author, we hereinafter use the first-person voice to describe her experiences. The data for this research include notes and observations I made during my training at the academy. These data consist of short comments I wrote in the margins of my class notebooks and notes that I took after hours, often talking into a tape recorder during the commute home. I transcribed over 100 pages of such field notes. Additional data include class notes on the formal curriculum taught in lectures, as well as over 500 pages of academy-provided materials.

I used the grounded theory method to analyze the data and generate theory. The goal of grounded theory is to use data to develop theory rather than to test existing theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). When using grounded theory, the processes of data collection, coding, and analysis are simultaneous (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and for much of the project this was the case. However, some of the coding was completed after the academy ended. Data analysis proceeded from coding, to developing conceptual categories based on the codes, to defining the conceptual categories, and finally to clarifying the links between the conceptual categories.

After passing the written and oral board entrance exams, an ethical dilemma arose concerning whether or not to inform other participants and school administrators of my intent to conduct participant observation research. This is the same dilemma many researchers face in doing participant observation (Diamond, 1992; Punch, 1986; Van Maanen, 1983). It became clear that making the research agenda known would jeopardize my chances of acceptance into the academy and would substantially alter my treatment by administrators, instructors, and other students, even if I were admitted. Thus, I did not reveal my identity as a researcher. The academy administration was aware that I was a graduate student in sociology and that I planned to finish my PhD. Many of the students knew that I had a master's degree (in fact, my nickname at the beginning of training was 'Masters') and that I planned to study women in law enforcement. Because the administration and other students were unaware that I was observing academy training, I rarely took field notes when I could be observed.

As a woman observing mostly male recruits, my experiences were probably different from those a man would have had. While my female status enabled my access to a wealth of data, it forced me to decide how I would handle mistreatment (Warren, 1988). As a woman in policing, there is a tension between being accepted by the group and proving that one is capable of performing police work. Acceptance often required acting in a stereotypically feminine way, yet acting capably usually contradicted such behavior (see S. Martin, 1980, for an explanation of how this occurs 'on the

job' for women police). This is, in fact, the central tension women faced in the police academy: trying to negotiate acceptance as a woman and as a cop at the same time. My solution was to challenge men's behavior toward me when it implied that I was unqualified, but to not challenge their opinions about and treatment of other women.

Results

The explicit curriculum and the hidden curriculum at the police academy stood in stark contrast to one another. The explicit curriculum was gender-neutral; the hidden curriculum was riddled with gendered lessons. The ostensibly gender-neutral curriculum of the academy had as its stated goal the production of professional and competent police officers, regardless of gender. The student policy manual was scrupulously gender-neutral. The use of gender-neutral pronouns, for example, was consistent throughout the manual, as were all sections describing personal grooming (e.g. 'trainee will present a neat and clean appearance') except in rare cases (e.g. 'sideburns will not extend past the center of the ear') that were directed to one sex only. Finally, the manual stated that, 'No sexual, racial, ethnic, or religious slurs will be tolerated. Any violation will result in your dismissal from the academy.' Field notes from the first day corroborate this message by noting the instructor's repeated avowal that inappropriate sexual or racial language was inexcusable.

Despite the gender-neutral formal curriculum, hegemonic masculinity continually reappeared in the hidden curriculum, inserted by male instructors and students via their treatment of each other and of women. The first two sections, below, describe how gender boundary-setting occurred in the police academy. The second two sections show how most men students and instructors conceptualized themselves — and men more generally — as not only different from but better than women. Table 1 summarizes these elements of the hidden curriculum.

Treating women as outsiders

Men in police academy training treated women students as outsiders by using gendered language, eliminating them from classroom examples, and excluding them from bonding experiences. Women learned that they were not considered members of the 'in-group', which was defined by masculinity. Men also learned that women were outsiders in policing and that there are no repercussions for treating them as such.

Instructors' use of gendered language was pervasive. Specifically, instructors used the male pronoun when referring to students or to law enforcement officers generally. The academy's director delivered a lecture in

Table 1: *The hidden curriculum in law enforcement training*

	Lessons for men	Lessons for women
Treating women as outsiders	Social and physical boundaries can be created through language that excludes women, through the assumption that cops are men, through bonding with other recruits around activities that exclude women.	Instructors and other students assume cops are men. Women are virtually ignored in curriculum and are excluded from social groups.
Exaggerating gender differences	Women and men are very different and this matters more than other differences between people. If women are strong, they are like men, which is inappropriate. 'Feminine' women are incapable of the physical demands of police work.	Women and men are very different and this matters more than other differences between people. Women are the ones who are different, men are the norm, so women will be treated differently.
Denigrating and objectifying women	Women are sexual objects. Women and women's issues (such as women's victimization) are not as valuable, good, or important as men or men's issues.	The place of women in the criminal justice system is as victims and as objects of men's fantasies and ridicule.
Resisting powerful women	Women in positions of power do not need to be taken seriously.	Women asserting authority will not be taken seriously by male police officers.

which he referred to us as 'gentlemen' and 'guys'. Only twice did he catch himself and add 'and ladies', a term with more connotations of sex-appropriate behavior than the term 'women'. Instructors' use of 'guys' when addressing us was normative. Regardless of the speaker's intent, people tend to picture men when hearing the words 'man' and 'he' (Richardson, 1993). Certainly women and men students learned that the normative cop was a man.

It sometimes seemed that female police officers did not exist in the instructors' worlds. For example, when instructing class members about how to perform searches, an instructor demonstrated a search on a male student and showed how men searching a woman would do things somewhat

differently in order to insure that her sexual privacy was not illegally invaded. (He made clear that the impetus behind such concern was fear of a lawsuit.) Yet, he never mentioned how women officers should search men suspects to similarly insure privacy. Clearly, he assumed that his audience of students was men, thus disregarding the women students.

Women instructors, too, perpetuated women's outsider status. One female instructor of 'employment skills' taught about appropriate attire for an interview, explaining that men should wear suits unless the interview were with a small, casual, department, in which case they might wear khaki pants, a nice shirt, and a tie. She spoke at length about how to determine which departments were casual. She mentioned that women, too, should wear suits and asked an already employed female student what she had worn to her interview, and that ended the discussion of women's interview attire. The instructor provided no details about how women should dress for different types of departments or what type of suit they should wear, leaving women recruits to ponder alone the relative merits of skirted and trouser suits. While attire is a minor issue, of course, the lesson that men's issues take precedence, even when a woman is directing the discussion, is not minor.

Police department recruiters hoping to hire new graduates gave periodic presentations, and they, too, pitched their material to a male audience. For example, one set of recruiters outlined the physical standards for male employees and completely ignored the female standard. Thus, students learned that 25-year-old men were required to run a mile and a half in approximately 12 minutes in order to be hired by a police department; no mention was made of the requirement for women. Other recruiters mentioned salary and benefit structures, but none mentioned parental leave or efforts to better integrate women. Students had opportunities to ask questions, but issues of specific interest to women recruits were not part of any recruiter's prepared presentation and were never asked in discussion.

Many men students acted as if the classroom were a male preserve by creating bonding experiences that excluded women. For example, one group of about ten men occasionally engaged in 'farting contests' and frank discussions about their sex lives. These discussions or activities usually terminated when a woman approached the group. In explaining why a loud and lively group of men tended to grow quiet when a woman approached, men students said things like, 'We can't talk about that now because there are ladies in the room', or 'That's not fit conversation in front of the ladies'. As Kanter (1977) pointed out over 20 years ago, such 'boundary heightening' remarks remind women that they are outsiders who are not welcome as full group members.

The glorification of violent masculinity further served to knit together men and exclude women. Male students frequently got together after class

in one another's homes or in bars to watch football games on television; women were not invited. On one occasion, a man brought a videotaped football game into the classroom and showed it during the lunch break; the female students remained silent and did crossword puzzles. While watching, the students debated referee calls and argued over which team was better. These disputes led to alliances over teams, further intensifying the female exclusionary ties built around football.

Physical fighting was a theme dwelled on by students and instructors alike during downtimes. In one instance, the women and men students were sitting around in the gymnasium waiting for the next activity when the head physical training instructor joined us to reminisce about his younger days as a police officer and the fights he would get into. In one story, he had left the scene, only to return minutes later to assist the uniformed officers who had shown up to break up the fight that he had precipitated! Much laughing on the part of the students ensued. Other of his stories similarly glorified bar fights and associated them with being a police officer. The link that men created between masculinity and violence in its vicarious form (football) and in its instantiated form (bar-room brawls) emphasized their commonalities as men and women's difference.

In sum, male instructors and students participated in constructing an ideology in which the term 'woman cop' was oxymoronic. Through language and bonding experiences it became clear that the 'in-group', in addition to other characteristics (such as whiteness, youth, and heterosexuality), was exclusively male. Thus, women and men learned that women are outsiders in the police world, and that women police officers can be ignored as exceptions who must learn to adjust to the existing environment.

Exaggerating gender differences

Male instructors and students exaggerated differences between themselves and the women they encountered and claimed that women's differences made them inferior to men. Students of both sexes learned that women and men by nature are very different and that gender differences supersede other differences, such as those stemming from race, ethnicity, or social class. In addition, men learned that women are rarely as physically strong as men and that those who are strong are 'like men', and thus not feminine. Women learned that women are treated differently at the academy, further serving to demonstrate that they are not entirely welcome in this environment, or at least not welcome as equals.

The 'human diversity' instructor conducted class exercises that entailed physically segregating students by sex, race, geographic region, and whether or not recruits had a family member in law enforcement. This resulted in one group of white women (seen as a sex group), one group of

black men (seen as a race group), and four groups of white men (a southern group, a northern group, a state-regional group, and a group with family members in law enforcement). A categorization problem arose for students whose characteristics spanned categories: which group should they align with? The instructor's solution was that sex and race 'trumped' the other categories: women and African-Americans were supposed to stay in 'their' sex or race groups even if they had family in law enforcement or identified with a region. While the ostensible point of the exercise was to make students aware of race and gender issues, the unintended effect of the hidden curriculum was to reify differences.

Another example of categorizing people in a way that reified sex differences occurred in defensive tactics class, where instructors paired women with women and men with men, purportedly to match similar-sized people. The matching of men was unproblematic: instructors suggested that men pair with men of similar size but did not suggest specific pairs. However, because we had an odd number of women, the last woman in line had to be paired with a larger man. Although at 5'9" I was larger than all of the women (and several of the men), I had already been paired with a woman. Yet if size, not gender, were the guiding criterion, the instructor would have reassigned me to partner with the man. The assignments seemed, for women at least, to be based less on size than on gender.

Instructors highlighted sex differences between recruits in several other ways. The 'human diversity' instructor showed an ABC-network video hosted by conservative media personality John Stossel that stressed the biological imperative of gender differences. The 'communication' instructor taught us that women and men communicate entirely differently, with women seeking emotional connectedness and men seeking solutions. Another instructor explained that while a few women were quite strong, such exceptions were 'not really like women at all'. Once he had tried to arrest a 250-pound woman whom he had mistakenly 'treated like a lady'. He explained, with great animation, that the woman almost escaped because he had been unprepared for her strength and fighting ability. His distinction between 'real women' (who were 'ladies' and physically weak) and 'strong women' (perpetrators who are unwomanly, and indeed, scary: 'they can kick you so that you won't be able to have children') put female recruits in a double bind: to be feminine they need to sacrifice strength; to be a cop they need to sacrifice femininity.

Some instructors treated women and men differently based on the stereotype that women were not naturally gifted at fighting. One instructor aggressively 'picked on' women in the physical training class. Class members practiced techniques wherein they close their eyes and await the 'attack', which they fend off with the new tactic being taught. The instructor moved around the room to replace the attacking student, yet he only attacked women students. When I asked him why, he said that, in fact, he

had attacked men but I simply had not seen him. (I am confident in my claim.) Because it is much more difficult to successfully perform defensive tactics against an experienced attacker, women students ended up appearing less competent (to themselves, to other students, and to the instructor) than men students, who only had to defend themselves against fellow inexperienced students. Women also experienced the opposite problem of not having enough instructor attention; another instructor demonstrated defensive tactics only on men.

Students, too, emphasized gender differences, claiming that partnering with a woman could be life-threatening (see also Charles, 1981). During obstacle-course training, for example, students had to pull a 150-pound dummy approximately 25 yards. Equal proportions of men and women had trouble with the dummy drag, as it was near the end of the physically exhausting obstacle course. Yet a student complained after the exercise that he would not want a woman to be his partner because she would never be able to drag him in an emergency. No other students publicly disagreed with him, and none of the instructors present intervened in the conversation.

Male students often treated women as if they were fragile. In physical training class, we practiced punching in pairs with protective pads. Each time, the same two or three men would very gently punch the pads women held, barely grazing the pad. These men would resume punching normally when they were switched to a male partner. Fellow students' treatment of me similarly assumed female fragility, even though I did not act in any stereotypically feminine ways. Our class president took me aside to ascertain whether I could stand up to the remarks of several male recruits who had 'gone too far' in talking about their sex lives and bodily functions in my presence. In doing so, he assumed both that I was offended (which, as a 'lady', I should have been) and that I needed help in confronting other students. Another insisted on trying to give me gun-shooting advice, even though I had both an instructor and a female student acting as coaches. While these men may have thought they were being helpful, such help was predicated on men's lack of respect for women's abilities and reified the notion of female weakness.

Male students and instructors emphasizing gender differences and acting on stereotypes of women's fragility can damage women's progress in policing. Students and instructors perpetuated the idea that women are not as qualified for police jobs as are men because they are different and inferior. Women recruits learned that they would be treated differently from male recruits at the academy and that men viewed them as intrinsically less capable and less qualified. Men learned that women are fundamentally different and thus are inadequate as police officers. They also learned some of the rudiments of appropriate masculinity by virtue of seeing it contrasted with a caricature of femininity.

Denigrating and objectifying women

We now turn to the evidence supporting the claim that masculinity is constructed not simply through lessons about what is masculine and what is not; in addition, men and women are taught that being male is better than being female. Men learned to disparage women by verbally denigrating and objectifying them (as in the comment 'there oughtta be a law against bitches'), and women students learned that such behavior is condoned by the institution they seek to enter. Men students belittled women and things associated with women — such as class material on domestic violence and rape — in addition to objectifying them. Women students learned that the expected role of women in the criminal justice system is as victims and as objects of male workers' fantasies and ridicule.

Male students' denigration of women occurred at the most basic level in their use of language. They called fellow male students 'pussies' when they failed to act appropriately manly. Besides its crudity, this expression equates femaleness with weakness, reinforcing other lessons about women's not belonging. Similarly, when students were cleaning the training room once, a man called out to the male broom-pushers, 'Why are you all sweeping? That's women's work!' This statement had the effect of insulting the men and women and delineating sharp boundaries around which tasks were masculine and which were not.

Another way that training denigrated and objectified women was through the presentation of women in training films and men's response to them. The class watched a recently made video about driving emergency vehicles in which a male officer daydreamed of a beautiful woman in a negligee when he was supposed to be concentrating on the road. The scene looked like it could have come from a pornographic film: the woman on the screen was on all fours crawling toward the camera while she licked her lips. As the class watched the film, many of the men chanted things like 'ohhh, baby' and 'hot mama'. In another instance, male students, with the instructor's unwitting complicity, dismissed the importance of crimes against women. The instructor left the room after activating the VCR to show a training film about domestic violence. Many class members ignored the film and talked loudly, often evaluating the appearance of the women in the film, particularly the women victims, saying things like 'hubba hubba' and 'ooh, she's cute!' When a woman who did not meet their standards of attractiveness appeared on the video, many men made fun of her appearance, groaning and calling out, 'she's ugly'. In this way, male students indicated their disregard for the material by ignoring the films when they were not busy rating actresses' beauty. Their actions also implied that women's appearance is more important than violence against them, indicating that to some extent they did not object to violence against women. The instructor's absence allowed the

men to demean women and disregard the importance of crimes against women.

Instructors chose films that degraded and objectified women, and men students learned from such course material and from fellow students' reactions that objectification of women was acceptable. They also learned that women are not as important or valuable as men. Male students also drew on negative images of women to insult one another during training. Thus, men's interactions with each other, along with training materials and men's responses to the materials, reconstructed stereotypes about women. Women recruits learned from these lessons of the hidden curriculum that men in the criminal justice system are likely to view women as victims and sexual objects who are subject to ridicule and contempt.

Resisting powerful women's authority

The academy taught male recruits that they need not treat women in positions of power or authority with the same respect or seriousness as they accord men. Several male students resisted women instructors' institutional power by 'acting out' and by openly questioning their authority. On one occasion, a woman instructor started a video about victims of burglary, robbery, domestic violence, and rape and left the room. She had explained that we were to watch all four segments of the video, but at the end of the first segment, one of the male students turned off the VCR. The male students laughed and joked about how we did not have to do anything at all since the instructor wasn't present. It is unclear whether the men's rebellion was directed at the woman instructor, the subject matter, or both. Nonetheless, it was clear that these men did not accept the authority of this woman instructor. In another instance, almost all the men (and most of the women) laughed disrespectfully at a woman instructor-trainee who had demonstrated a physical technique incorrectly. Students also talked among themselves during female instructors' lectures more often and more loudly than during male instructors' lectures. A female instructor's lecture on 'employment skills' was repeatedly interrupted by rowdiness, until finally a female student complained to the administration.

The disrespect accorded women instructors spilled over onto treatment of female students. On the firing range, we lined up in rows, with each student coaching the shooter in front as we rotated through the shooting position. When it was my turn to coach a male student, he listened to my comments, and explained that he would not do as I suggested because he had a shooting style he liked and did not intend to change. When instructors later gave him the same advice, he obeyed. Of course, he also might have rejected advice from a male student, but I overheard no instances of this in any of the range practices.

In sum, students treated female instructors with less courtesy and respect. Male students learned that they need not accept women as superiors, or perhaps even as equals. Female students learned that male police officers may not listen to them or accept their advice were they to be in positions of authority or even equality. Because women cops will be in situations where it is crucial to relay information to men officers who then may not take it seriously, this lack of respect may give rise to second thoughts for women would-be officers.

Conclusion

While there may be no law against women (or bitches) entering the police academy, the hidden curriculum there taught recruits that dominant masculinity is necessary to performing their duties as cops. Women's presence at the academy facilitated these lessons by indicating the boundaries surrounding masculinity (accomplished through differentiation) and by highlighting masculinity's superiority over things not-masculine. Specifically, male students learned that it is acceptable to exclude women, that women are naturally very different from men and thus can be treated differently, that denigrating and objectifying women is commonplace and expected, and that they can disregard women in authority. For each of these lessons, male recruits learned accompanying strategies for excluding and antagonizing women, strategies that effectively communicated to women that they were not welcome as equals.

Three decades of research have indicated the informal barriers that male co-workers and supervisors establish to counter the threat of women's entry into traditionally male occupations (Gruber and Bjorn, 1982; Cockburn, 1988; Swerdlow, 1989; Gruber, 1998). Some male resistance stems from women's disruption of male bonding and the equation of masculine men with masculine work. We have extended understanding of the resistance process by showing that women's presence can, in fact, further the project of masculinity construction, and we offer evidence from the training grounds of one of the most masculine professions. In police academy training male students and instructors used the presence of women to aid in their construction of divisions along gender lines. As Acker (1990, 1999b) explained, the construction of such divisions sustains the gender status quo of organizations.

Why is men's domination of this particular occupation so resistant to change when women have successfully entered other formerly male domains, such as law? Perhaps the comparison of police work to other legal-system occupations is ill conceived. Men's resistance to women in policing is probably more similar to military men's resistance to women, since both involve a particular type of masculinity defined by men's control

of violence. Men have always maintained a monopoly on organized violence (Connell, 1987, p. 107, 1995; Enloe, 1989; Messerschmidt, 1993; see also Barrett, 1996). In general, most militaries and police — and the individuals who control them, such as judges and general — are men. The exclusion of women from the means of organized violence, including instruction in the use of weapons and military technique is not accidental (Connell, 1987, p. 107, 1995). Indeed, as Enloe (1989, p. 6) noted, '[S]ocial processes and structures ... have been created and sustained over the generations — sometimes coercively — to keep most women out of any political position with influence over state force.' Control over institutionalized violence is a core component of men's authority in western cultures (Connell, 1987). Thus, while police culture, like the culture of many other male-dominated occupations, defines itself through masculinity, it is perhaps the association not only with masculinity, but also with violence, that leads men to resist women in policing.

Directions for future research

Women are not the only group used to help construct masculinity in police academies and departments. The culture of masculinity in these sites has traditionally excluded some men, particularly those who do not fit the requirements of hegemonic masculinity (see Bird, 1996; Acker, 1999b). Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to other masculinities as well as in relation to femininity (Connell, 1995). For this reason, the presence of men who do not conform to hegemonic masculinity may threaten some men's association of masculine identity and police work. How is masculinity constructed in relation to other men as well as women? Specifically, on what criteria do men judge other men for police group membership? The construction of masculinity is complex, and understanding how men construct it in relation to other men may offer insights into their hostility towards women's presence.

Our findings are limited to the experiences and treatment of white women in one academy. These limitations point to the importance of gathering data from multiple programs and types of departments, thus permitting investigation into the crucial question of which organizational characteristics lead to less hostile training environments for women. Similar research unpacking the relationship between notions of race and ethnicity to notions of masculinity (Cose, 1995) and how various organizational practices can mediate the treatment of people of color in academies and on police forces is also crucial. Understanding the nature of the barriers faced by women, minorities, and other groups who are 'outsiders' to hegemonic masculinity is the first step in fighting for their inclusion in a politically crucial occupational niche.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the comments of Patricia Yancey Martin, Jan Thomas, David Quadagno, the Tallahassee Chapter of Sociologists for Women in Society, the Henry A. Murray Research Center and the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, and anonymous reviewers from *Gender, Work and Organization*.

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[19]

Men Behind Bars

“Doing” Masculinity as an Adaptation to Imprisonment

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This article, which is part of a wider ethnographic study of constructions of self in the mediated world of men’s prisons, explores “manliness” as the prison coping strategy par excellence. That masculinity is likely to become more extreme in men’s prisons is unsurprising, but the origins and nature of the “hypermasculine” culture and the precise means by which hierarchies of domination are created and maintained have yet to be thoroughly explored. Indeed, although men constitute the vast majority of prisoners worldwide, most studies treat the gender of their subjects as incidental and assume that in men’s prisons, the normal rules of patriarchy do not apply. However, as this article demonstrates, the notion of patriarchy, although in need of refinement, is not irrelevant to the predominantly male environment, and it is now widely accepted that men can be its victims as well as its perpetrators.

Key words: prisoners; identity; self; hypermasculinity; fraternity; power

THE “PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT”: IMPORTED OR INTRINSIC?

Prisoners are overwhelmingly young, male, unemployed, and drawn from the lower working classes. Explanations of why groups of people who face structural discrimination do not take collective action to improve the conditions of their lives but seemingly collude in their subordination by accepting the restricted life choices available to them is a complex area of analysis, but much of the so-called prison importation literature (e.g. Irwin and Cressey 1962) suggests that the forms and codes of overtly masculine behavior that characterize working-class cultures are implicated in the replication and perpetuation of imprisonment. To put it succinctly, criminal behavior in society may be regarded (at least to a significant degree) as a learned response to the imperatives of masculine hegemony, while in prisons, masculinity may be

Author’s Note: This article draws on materials that appear in Jewkes (2002) Captive Audience: Media, Masculinity and Power in Prisons. Thanks go to the anonymous reviewers whose comments on an earlier draft of this article were very valuable. Correspondence regarding this article may be sent to Dr. Yvonne Jewkes at the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, CASS, University of Hull, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK; e-mail: Y.Jewkes@hull.ac.uk.

seen as a learned response to the imperatives of the criminal inmate culture. Charlesworth (2000) provides an exposition of the spiral of self-destruction that culture can engender in a phenomenological account of the lives of working-class men in a town in northern England. Among the factors he highlights as being integral to the reproduction of disadvantage are the presentation of a heavily managed "front," indicating a potential capacity for aggression that must be constantly maintained in the face of systemic disrespect and stigmatization; lives lived in the context of circumscribed horizons and minimal expectations; and an inability to look beyond government institutions to broader structures of inequality when apportioning blame for the pain and degradation routinely suffered. But while inmates clearly import with them into prison a recognizable set of experiences, belief systems, and moral standpoints (arguably far wider than that which Charlesworth suggests), the experience of confinement nonetheless unites them, to some degree, in a shared experience of and response to pain and deprivation (Grapendaal 1990).

One of the earliest and most influential commentaries on prison societies is Gresham Sykes's (1958) *The Society of Captives*. Sykes observes that prisoners have to endure various structural deprivations—the "pains of imprisonment"—including losses of liberty, autonomy, security, goods and services, and heterosexual relations. For Sykes and his acolytes (*The Society of Captives* was recently "top-ranked book in prison studies"; Reisig 2001), these deprivations go significantly beyond simple discomfort, threatening the inmates' psychological well-being and attacking their sense of self-worth. Sykes's conceptualization of the structural deprivations inherent in totalitarian systems of power bears some similarities to Goffman's concept of "total institutions." For Goffman, the transition from the outside community to the world within the prison institution involves a symbolic significance that goes well beyond the passage from a "free" world to a "closed" environment. Described as a "civil death" (Goffman 1961a, 25), entry into the total institution involves being subjected to a series of social and psychological attacks that undermine the sense of self:

The recruit . . . comes into the establishment with a conception of himself made possible by certain stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of the support provided by these arrangements . . . [and] he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations and profanations of self. His self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. (Goffman 1961b, 23)

The assaults on individuals' sense of self and self-worth highlighted by these two writers remind us that however familiar some aspects of the prison culture are to some inmates, their ability to adapt to the rigors of confinement will be at least as related to their present predicament as they are to the

possible influences of life before prison (Sykes 1958). The remainder of this article will draw on ethnographic data from an empirical study of four men's prisons of various security classifications in the English Midlands. It will first explore the notion of patriarchy in relation to predominantly male environments. It will then argue that the ability of men to survive their prison sentences in this climate of mortification and brutality may depend on two factors: first, they must negotiate their position within a prison hierarchy that is based on excessive displays of manliness, constructing a public identity that allows them to "fit in" with the dominant culture; and secondly, they must be able to simultaneously maintain and nurture a private, interior (and usually non-"macho") sense of self.

PATRIARCHY, FRATRIARCHY, AND HIERARCHY IN PRISONS

You definitely have to wear a mask in prison—if you don't you're going to get eaten away. When I came in I was green. I thought I was quite streetwise on the outside, but no. You have to act tough. There's always the threat of violence. (Simon)¹

Of all the "pains" associated with imprisonment, the fear for personal safety, which is engendered in every direction between inmates and staff, is arguably the overriding feature of life in most institutions (Scraton, Sim, and Skidmore 1991). For most inmates, peer group respect, individual status, and access to scarce resources all rest on a reputation for aggressiveness and physical strength. As in any organization, a climate of fear is bound to lead to the exploitation of weaker individuals by more powerful ones, and in prison, the illusion of power seems, on the surface at least, to resemble traditional patterns of patriarchy, with vulnerable prisoners, such as sex offenders, being routinely objectified, intimidated, and subjected to violence. Despite its wide usage, however, patriarchy has become corrupted in the wake of the feminist women's movement and has become a kind of shorthand ascription that grossly oversimplifies the structures of gender (Connell 1987). Patriarchy is now popularly used to describe what might more properly be termed *androcracy*—that is, rule by men (Remy 1990).

One way of overcoming the ambiguities inherent in the term *patriarchy* (the rule of the fathers) is to consider, instead, the merits of *fratriarchy* (the rule of the brothers), a mode of male domination that shares some of the origins of patriarchy yet is, nonetheless, concerned with a very different set of values, which seem more appropriate in an analysis of a predominantly male environment. Although not in common usage, the term *fratriarchy* is used by some gender theorists (e.g., Remy 1990; Brod 1990) to account for the disjunction between the facts of public male power and feelings of individual male powerlessness. It thus explains how, within a broadly patriarchal

society in which the oppression and subjugation of women is well documented, superordinate notions of masculinity serve to weaken—for want of a better word, “feminize”—the authority of some men. Where patriarchy is a father-to-son transmission of authority and is therefore intergenerational, the dimension of temporal continuity is rendered more problematic in the intragenerational relationships of the brotherhood:

As opposed to the patriarch, who embodied many levels and kinds of authority in his single person, the brothers stand in uneasy relationships with each other, engaged in sibling rivalry while trying to keep the power of the family of man as a whole intact. (Brod 1990, 133)

Furthermore, while the brothers may share the desires of the patriarch in matters of paternity and parenting, it is a concern largely fuelled by self-interest. Gilmore (1990, 223) states that the three core elements of manhood are impregnating women, providing for one’s dependants, and protecting one’s kin. While these codes of behavior are undoubtedly characteristic of men across the socioeconomic strata, it is arguable that in the lower working classes these ideals are transmuted according to the demands of association with other men and the freedom to do as one pleases and have a good time. As such, even men who marry and/or have children may permanently remain psychologically trapped in the fraternal fellowship, eschewing all responsibilities and thriving on the conflict and aggression characteristic of most male associations. As Remy (1990) demonstrates in the parlance of the 1970s, this generally amounts to “causing a bit of bovver” (p. 45).

Remy uses the term “men’s hut”² as a metaphor for the public institutions where men go primarily to associate with other men: “This is . . . where those males who have earned the right to call themselves *men*, or are in the process of attaining this emblem of privilege, gather” (Remy 1990, 45). Men’s huts for the middle-classes are institutions such as golf clubs, gentlemen’s clubs, and Freemasons lodges, while working-class manifestations include pubs and betting shops. Male bonding has also, of course, found its expression in a highly visible form in political arenas, including the Houses of Parliament and extreme right-wing movements. The interesting aspect of men’s huts, from the perspective of unequal power relations among men, is that they emphatically exclude not only women but also those males who have not yet earned the right to call themselves men. This form of “social closure” operates through a number of mechanisms, including exclusion of those who have not yet passed the requisite rites of passage, those who are either too old or too young to be fully respected by their peers, and those who are not versed in the special language, or the “argot,” that frequently characterizes these groups. In all these respects, prison societies can be said to resemble men’s huts and can be seen as a continuation of practices adopted in the working-class world of manual labor, where male ascendancy over other men on the

basis of age, authority, and peer group credentials is frequently evident (Willis 1977). Apprenticeships and probationary training periods are commonly remembered as a humiliating induction into masculinity as well as trade. Yet, once the training has been successfully completed, the apprentices are generally accepted as “brothers” (Cockburn 1986). Similarly, the new prison inmate will frequently have to undergo a period of testing, involving some kind of initiation, which may entail physical assertions of strength. Young-offenders institutes are particularly notorious for the bullying that takes place on induction, but in all custodial settings, if the victim succeeds in defending himself and asserting his autonomy, he will often be accepted, at least by some sections of the prison fraternity:

I was proud entering Wormwood Scrubs at fifteen. Before that, I was in a remand home at the age of twelve. It gave me status going to the Scrubs. . . . We'd gone thieving and had lookouts and everything. We thought we were the real thing, we felt like big men. Once inside you had to go through “recepobashing”—a kind of initiation where you were beaten by your “friends” to within an inch of your life. I won the fight . . . beat up three out of the four [assailants]. That made me “The Chap.” (Jim)

Such brutality confirms Bowker's (1977, xi) assertion that what prisoners inflict on each other is often far worse than anything staff do to them, but, as Jim's quote indicates, it is often only those who pass such barbaric tests of manliness who gain the advantage of solidarity. Male bonding in prison, as in other predominately male spheres, reaffirms masculine hegemony not only by excluding women but also by preying on weaker men.

MASCULINITY AS PERFORMANCE

All forms of masculinity inevitably involve a certain degree of putting on a “manly front,” and it therefore seems reasonable to consider the outward manifestation of all masculinities as presentation or performance. This dramaturgical conception of self, made famous by Goffman (1959), is taken up by Andrew Tolson, who gives the dramatic motif a class-based edge, arguing that the working-class boy “expresses himself, not so much in an inner competitive struggle for achievement, as through a collective toughness, a masculine ‘performance’ recognised and approved by his ‘mates’” (Tolson 1977, 43). Although it is not being suggested here that middle-class boys do not share this need to live up to certain idealized representations of masculinity to gain the respect of their peers (based predominantly on educational and sporting achievement, perhaps), the concern here is with lower class males for whom masculinity is a kind of ritualized dramatic enactment, a generally mundane and predictable display, punctuated by sporadic bursts of excitement.

In his classic study of street-corner culture, Corrigan (1975) testifies to the intense activity that is involved in the common pursuit of "doing nothing," echoing other commentators' observations concerning passing time in prison. Occasionally, confrontations or "contests of honor" between rival gangs have to be fought and won to preserve a masculine reputation (Newburn and Stanko 1994). Contests are usually fought over territory, and a dominant feature of the working class is the intense loyalty to the locality; districts, neighborhoods, streets, and even smaller "patches" than that are closely marked by gangs and guarded, "often to apparent absurdity" (Tolson 1977, 42). Such locales arguably constitute a place where the powerful construct and exercise their power, but the weak create their own "spaces" within those places, making them temporarily their own as they occupy and move through them (De Certeau 1984). De Certeau uses the language of warfare, arguing that subordinates are like guerrillas, appropriating space as a means of resistance. This metaphor seems particularly apt in relation to the spaces connecting the different areas of prisons. Wing corridors are often called "the streets" by inmates, and it is in these long, narrow corridors, which are frequently beyond the direct sight of staff, that groups of inmates congregate during association time to replicate some of the activities that might be encountered among such groups of young men on the real streets outside:

In here is like the street, like a rough council estate. We're all streetwise. You have to keep your street credibility, maintain an image. You get a lot of talk and bravado. It's exactly the same as on the outside. (John)

Given the opportunities these locations provide for inmates to mingle out of sight of any authorities, it may not be just banter that is exchanged in these corridors. However, an important aspect of the lower working-class male's existence is the ability to "talk up" his physical prowess. Even if an individual rarely has the need to engage in actual combat, he must impress his audience with his repertoire of stories and jokes, and he learns at an early age that bravado is a key element in gaining membership to the fraternity. But it may simply be that like the adolescent youths encountered by Corrigan (1975), prisoners are actively engaged in the social practice of doing nothing except marking their patch when hanging around in communal spaces. They have found a way of using the imposed system of association activity and creating a territorial, subcultural space reminiscent of those they would occupy on the outside.

INMATE RELATIONS

Inmate solidarity of the type and intensity described by early prison researchers such as Sykes is rare now; the drugs culture that exists in all prisons has created a "dog eat dog" environment in which individuals are unwise

and unwilling to put their trust in fellow inmates. But pressure to fit in with the dominant culture is nonetheless strong, and conformity to types of behavior seems to result in a "move in a direction of solidarity" (Hood and Sparks 1970), which ameliorates some of the problems associated with life as an individual in a rigidly structured, closed social environment:

I share a cell—that's my choice. . . . The main attraction of twoing-up is having someone to talk to. It's like therapy. I'd done a year on my own but to share with someone was quite attractive. I'd not really spoken to anyone for a year, only very shallow conversations. Same with Theo, the Dutch guy. Another Dutch man came in and it really opened up his world. He used to be in his cell all the time before. (David)

You tend to get like hanging around with like. Drug dealers stick together—it's hip in here. I don't mix with the bag heads [heroin users] or house burglars—they're scum. . . . I'm choosy about whose company I keep. My closest friend here is my co-defendant but you can't really have friends in prison, just associates. (Tom)

Some prisoners look up to others because of the crimes they've committed—mostly the would-be gangsters. You *can* have friends in prison. If you see another black person in prison you know you'll survive. They'll be bona fide friends because you're both convicted, you can talk, smoke draw, reason, share personal stuff. . . . We speak in jargon, lyrics. With my brothers, it's a safe environment. (Paul)

Absorption into one or other of the subcultures in prison and the resulting sense of belonging to a group with a strong identity (whether the primary identification is based on ethnicity, political or criminal ideologies, access to contraband economies, or some other variable) may provide partial explanation for high recidivism rates in most Western countries. In other words, the custodial experience provides a highly structured environment, which demands an adherence to an inmate code and provides ontological security based on mutual support and camaraderie for people who have otherwise found their life chances seriously diminished. This cohesive structure among similarly disadvantaged social misfits helps to compensate for the bleaker aspects of prison life (Hood and Sparks 1970):

I've been here before so I'm used to it—I just see it as a break. . . . I had all the usual fears of violence and rape, and so on, but then I got here and found I knew half the people in here, so I was alright. (Michael)

Yet ironically, it is the very existence of male subcultures that weakens the hegemonic notion of masculinity to which disadvantaged men are culturally encouraged to aspire and that ensures the social reproduction of deprivation and marginalization. Inside the locally constructed lower working-class world, there is little room for deviation from the prescribed norms that characterize this group, and conformity is paramount. For example, it is arguable

that young lower working-class men are increasingly less likely to form their identities on the basis of occupation and life chances and are more likely to get their sense of self through the kind of tribal, collective identity that is fostered by football, music, or some other “fanship.” The difficulty that faces them is that all these identifications require conspicuous consumption of designer-label clothing and accessories, and it may be that young men in today’s anomic society are fostering at an early age not the skills necessary to prepare them for a mundane working life in industry but rather the wells of ungratified desire which instill a sense of dissatisfaction with the gains to be made through legitimate means. Although it is not being suggested that all lower working-class males are unable to find ways of accomplishing masculinity in ways that do not involve crime, it might reasonably be assumed that those who do offend bring into prison with them a masculine ideology and commitment to a criminal subculture that prepares them for life inside. Once in prison, the intensity of the desirable male image is magnified further. As Gilmore notes, “the harsher the environment and the scarcer the resources, the more manhood is stressed as inspiration and goal” (Gilmore 1990, 224). Few environments offer a more intensely harsh, unproductive, and impoverished set of circumstances than the prison.

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN PRISONS

The desire to prove one’s manhood, which frequently leads to criminal behavior, conviction, and imprisonment, may itself, then, be a prerequisite to a successful adaptation to life inside. This may be particularly true of those who have committed very serious offenses, who might be said to import with them into prison the ideology of aggressive masculine values that precipitated their crimes in the first place. For example, while the many young, short-term, petty criminals that make up the prison population adhere to a particular style of masculinity, they are dismissed as “wannabes” by older, long-term, or life-sentence inmates who are equally keen to emphasize their own credentials as “proper” villains:

It’s a Mickey Mouse jail—full of young scallies and inadequates. It’s mostly kids now, charging around and making a lot of noise. [This] could be the best prison in the country for long-termers to finish off their sentences, but it’s spoilt by the short-termers on heroin. A lot of idiots and parasites really. Prisons have degenerated since the old days. They’re just criminal factories now. (Ray)

There are one or two bullies on the wing. They tend to pick on the weaker ones, those who look young or vulnerable. Every time you go to a new prison you let it be known that, while you’re a good guy, you’re not to be messed around. It’s an aura: “don’t pick on me.” People pick up on that, they know you don’t muck around with lifers. You put across that if you pick on me, shit will fly. You’re picking on a piece of hard stuff. They can pick on me verbally, it’s water off a

duck's back. But no-one's going to go for me physically because they know what I'm capable of, what I'm in here for. For example, if someone goes into my cell I'll break their fingers. I think violence should never be used unless it is the pure last resort. But if someone asked for it, I'd resort to it. (Roy)

[This prison] is like a children's home. You have a lot of wannabe gangsters in here—"plastic gangsters" we call them. I'm "Old Firm." We get respect. I'm well known inside and outside. I like the fact that I'm Mister Big both here and on the streets. (Dave)

Feminist writer Nicole Ward Jouve further illustrates the significance of the prevailing culture on the precipitation of serious offenses in her account of the circumstances surrounding the crimes of the serial killer Peter Sutcliffe (known as the "Yorkshire Ripper"), who killed thirteen women in the north of England between 1975 and 1980. She argues that "the whole aura of . . . aggressive maleness that surrounded Sutcliffe made his murders possible" (Ward Jouve 1988, 144). This aura was provided partially by a father who, Ward Jouve suspects, would rather have a mass murderer for a son than a closet homosexual and by friends of the offender who "regarded prostitute-bashing as a joke" (p. 144). Ward Jouve's exploration of Sutcliffe's relationships reinforces the point that hegemonic masculinity is not achieved solely through domination over women but is also constructed in relation to subordinated or less powerful men. In other words, achieving hegemony may depend on the relationship and interplay between the different definitions that a culture makes available at any given time. For example, in the context of the prison, the power achieved and held on to by those at the top of the prisoner hierarchy is to some degree legitimized, normalized, and sustained by its opposite number at the bottom. Put simply, the hegemonic masculinity at the apex of the hierarchy of power, represented most strongly by the professional criminal and armed robber, is culturally reinforced by its opposite number at the bottom—that is, the rapist and pedophile, who deviate from conventional heterosexual masculine norms. Furthermore, physical violence frequently endorses dominant cultural patterns. The fact that assaults on some inmates (by both fellow inmates and by officers) occur and are tolerated by those with the authority to intervene demonstrates that hegemonic values based on physical coercion are part of the complex horizontal and vertical relationships instituted between prisoners and prison officers and between these groups and what Sim calls the "technocrats who occupy powerful positions as governors, area managers and state bureaucrats in the Home Office" (Sim 1994, 102).³

Hegemonic masculinity in prisons, then, is clearly as bound up with aggression and violence as it is on the outside. That is not to say that the most violent men (in respect to their crimes or to their behavior in prison) are the most powerful inside; indeed, the volatile offender is more likely to be marginalized than respected. Nevertheless, a certain degree of "controlled

aggression” is required to survive the psychological and physical rigors of imprisonment. Ascendancy achieved by means of threats, bullying, and predatory aggressiveness is not hegemony, but the necessity of establishing a no-nonsense, tough reputation on reception into a new institution is well documented in personal accounts of life inside. Of course, physical jostling for positions of power and status are common among lower working-class groups of males, but it is perhaps especially visible in prisons because they are such blatantly status-depriving environments and therefore create a particularly acute need for indices of relative status (Toch 1975, 64). But even after a tough facade has been established, it has to be maintained, and this in itself can be a great source of pressure. Toch notes that some inmates go to extraordinary lengths to accommodate an image of themselves that conforms to the hegemonic ideal but that when approached by nonjudgmental outsiders (such as university researchers), their manly self-portraits crumble and, indeed, are “relinquished with gratitude” (Toch 1975, 15); this is a finding supported by the participants in this study. Tony’s comment was typical:

I’m really glad I’ve talked to you. Sorry I was a bit uncooperative to start with, but you’re naturally suspicious of people in here. I feel like I’ve got some really important things off my chest, though, talking to you. It’s nice to be able to be myself for a change.

SELF AND IDENTITY

“Wearing a mask” is arguably the most common strategy for coping with the rigors of imprisonment, and all prison researchers will be familiar with the sentiment that inmates feel it necessary to adopt a facade while inside. But equally, they have probably been told that the presentation of a heavily managed “front” is impossible to sustain for prolonged periods inside prison. Indeed, it is arguable that the facility to discard the mask and “be oneself” is not only desirable but is absolutely necessary if a prisoner is to “get through” their sentence with their self-esteem reasonably in tact (Jewkes 2002). Self and identity—usually conceived as two sides of the same coin—can thus be distinguished. Self emphasizes difference and requires prisoners to draw on the specific interpersonal relations (family, work, style, cultural preferences, etc.) that mark them out as being distinct from the rest of the inmate population. Identity stresses similarity and requires inmates to hail the dispositions and resources that enable them to engage with and integrate into the prevailing inmate culture. Prisoners may be constantly engaged in these two interlocking forms of emotional endeavor (Craib 1998)—that is, the “internal” work of coping with conflict, fear, and disorientation and the “external” work of reconciling what goes on inside with the construction and maintenance of a culturally acceptable, masculine identity.

This distinction between the private sense of self and the public presentation of identity is usually conceptualized in terms of their "backstage" and "frontstage" settings, respectively (Goffman 1959; see also Giddens 1984). Backstage is where one's basic, personal ontological security system is restored and where the tensions associated with sustaining the particular bodily, gestural, and verbal codes that are demanded in this setting are diffused:

I get angry and lonely, but not bitter. I know I can only blame myself. Thank God we're allowed CD players in here. I get rid of frustration by listening to Black Sabbath or Led Zeppelin very, very loud. You have to come over a bit harder in here; you have to stand tall and show you can't be intimidated. But at night you can get back in your pad and be yourself. It's the only thing that keeps me sane. (Dave)

My private time is in the evening. I write letters between 9:30 and 10 every night. People know not to disturb me then. I write two sides of A4 every evening. I keep two diaries as well, one for my missus and one for me. That's good—an outlet. I'm terrified of losing Sharon. . . . She's my wife, my lover, my best friend, everything to me really. But I get this little . . . "belly feeling," I call it. Anxiety I suppose. That's why it's so important for me to keep writing to her, to let her know how much she means to me. (Craig)

I become myself at lock up. I'm sometimes glad when 8 o'clock comes and you can lock yourself away. People handle it in different ways. I like to walk around the sports field and just reflect. Others smash a window or self harm or talk to their mates or the chaplain. (Ray)

Frontstage is where the public aspect of one's identity will be presented in social engagement with others. The public persona that individuals present when interacting with others inside prison may be a familiar guise, constructed and refined through a long process of socialization into male-dominated subcultures as a child, adolescent, and adult. For example, an inmate from the kind of lower working-class background from which prisoners are predominantly drawn might bring with him a type of knowledge, speech pattern, attitude, and so on, that will enable him to fit in to the inmate culture more easily than his middle-class counterpart. But a middle-class prisoner might feel more comfortable when dealing with figures of authority in the penal system because of shared values, life experiences, and educational background. However, imprisonment may involve disruption of the equilibrium between the two spheres, resulting in further damage to the individual's sense of well-being. If forced to share a cell with one or more other inmates, the prisoner may be continually in an enforced state of frontstage, with little opportunity to restore his interior sense of self. If locked up on his own for prolonged periods, on the other hand, he may suffer equally in his inability to engage in frontstage activity. This blurring of the boundaries between frontstage and backstage, together with the pressure for conformity and compli-

ance, may undermine the inmate's personal and social identities, preventing both from functioning as they would in other circumstances:

I hate prison because I have to pretend to be someone I'm not. In my cell I can be myself but as soon as I come out I have to stand differently, present myself differently. When I'm on the phone I have to remember to swap over to myself. . . . People can't spend enough time being their private selves in [prison]. . . . I feel like I've got a split personality. (Craig)

But whatever resources the new inmate is able to import into prison with him, many, regardless of their background and social class, will arrive at reception with a fairly consistent picture of what prison is like (often informed by media-generated images of violence and intimidation) and then proceed to adjust their perceptions as they observe and interact with other prisoners:

Through watching others, through eavesdropping, through cautious conversation and selective interaction, a new inmate refines his understanding of what . . . prisoners look like, how they move, how they act. Despite his belief that he is different from these other prisoners, he knows that he cannot appear to be too different from them, if he is to hide his vulnerability. His initial image of other prisoners, his early observations, and his concern over how he appears to others thus provide a foundation for the identity he gradually creates through impression management. (Schmid and Jones 1991, 422)

I remember for the first six months I was here, standing in the queue for meals, trying not to make eye contact with anyone in case they took it the wrong way. I'm a bit more relaxed now, but you still have to be on your guard the whole time. (Simon)

For some inmates the presentation of self will be a familiar, if not exaggerated, version of the social identity developed prior to entering prison. But as Schmid and Jones (1991) suggest, most new inmates feel vulnerable, and it might be argued that prisoners are not quite as adept at role playing and impression management as is sometimes assumed. In particular, not all inmates are able to conform to the superordinate version of masculinity that seems to ensure an easier passage through a prison career. For some, the projection of a false identity will, quite simply, be beyond their impression-management skills, and they will be forced to withdraw—literally and emotionally—into their private self (Goffman 1961a; Cohen and Taylor 1972):

It's this macho thing that grinds you down. I think it's a shame really. I've been all over Europe and you just don't see it, it's something peculiar about British culture. In jail you're constantly on your guard. You have to be man enough to stand up for yourself or you get walked over. Prison is a brain drain—you have to be on your toes or just stay in your cell and try to be invisible. (George)

Not everyone can cope with prison. Crime is itself often the result of poor socialization skills. There are people in here that you never, ever see. They're in

here because they have no social skills and they're antisocial while they're in here. What chance do they have? That's why there's so much self-harm and suicide in prison. (Garth)

Garth's comment reminds us that prison research can only take account of the survivors of the prison experience and that those inmates who have thought about taking their own lives while in prison (seventeen to eighteen percent of the total inmate population) report higher-than-average feelings of apathy, boredom, and lethargy (Liebling 1992). Worrall (2000) has criticized what she describes as the "outward bound mentality" of the prisoner-coping literature, arguing that the overriding expectation that prisoners should find ways of coping is incompatible with inmates' own expectations—some simply do not want to cope. And so it was for some of the men I interviewed who talked movingly of their suffering and losses and who had experienced periods of deep depression that were only exacerbated by the demands of the performative masculine culture. The desire to disengage from, or "tune out" of, prison routine was, in such circumstances, entirely understandable.

Even inmates who succeed in establishing a tough, no-nonsense reputation to survive the psychological and physical rigors of imprisonment may find their sense of the masculine changing as their sentence proceeds. For example, the importance of maintaining a "hard" front may diminish as the end of their sentence nears:

I just want to keep my head down and stay out of trouble. I've been in bother before and had days added, . . . but now I can see my release day ahead of me, so I'm just seeing out the last few weeks, not getting into any bother. . . . I just stay in my pad, watch TV all day and sleep as much as possible. I've got nothing to prove anymore. (Matt)

Alternatively, prisoners may seek to reestablish and assert their masculinity throughout their sentences in more subtle ways than simply adopting an aggressive, "hard man" stance. For example, many inmates construct new identities as students or tradesmen:

I tried to re-invent myself when I got sent down. I wasn't happy with my identity before I came in, I felt a failure. Now I need to prove I can do what I'm doing. I'm doing an Open University degree. . . . I read newspapers and watch TV, but select things that are a lot more intellectual than I would have before. It's all part of the re-invention of myself. I've matured more in the past five years than in the thirty-four years before. I'm studying Ancient Greek and I read proper newspapers. If I'd been put inside when I was sixteen I might have turned out a better person. I was a wimp when I came in; now I'm much more assertive. (Dave)

I did an HND at Stafford [prison] in Business Studies. It gave me confidence and self-esteem. I achieved something. But generally in prison I have a sense of not having my responsibilities, not being a man. (Craig)

While not explicitly (hyper)masculine identities, the adoption of student, artisan, or tradesman identities nourishes the self and is typical of working-class cultures, particularly among the male, working-class unemployed (Sapsford 1983). "Scholar" and "work" identities also provide an alternative to the dominant masculine hegemony for middle-class prisoners, where skills ranging from the ability to read to the possession of legal knowledge may provide an opportunity to flaunt oneself symbolically in a kind of "psychological one-upmanship" (Cohen and Taylor 1972).

Also intrinsic to masculine rituals of display are symbols of conspicuous consumption, and although prisoners may earn as little as £7 a week it is nonetheless important to be visibly consuming if their adequacy as a man is to be upheld (Bostyn and Wight 1987). The influences of commodification can be seen in a variety of prisoners' possessions. For example, in the broader study from which this data is drawn (Jewkes 2002), it was noted that among a group of maximum-security inmates, one indicator of both lifestyle aspirations and the need to signal to the group something of one's preprison identity was footwear. Most inmates are young, street-wise urbanites, and they literally wear their masculine credentials on their feet. Their new and expensive designer-label trainers indicate a desire to fit in with the dominant norms and yet also suggest a degree of competitiveness; for some inmates, it is important not to get left behind in the rapidly moving worlds of fashion and footwear technology. By contrast, a middle-class Dutch prisoner serving time in a medium-security jail, while resigned to wearing his shabby and threadbare prison uniform, had on his feet a pair of elegant, highly polished, brown leather brogues. Not only aesthetic but also clearly expensive, his shoes, he admitted, were important for him to be allowed to wear, not only to maintain a sense of himself as a man of taste and culture but also to signal to the other inmates and, importantly, to the prison officers that he was "different, more refined, than they are."

Some commentators (e.g., Lefebvre 1971; Brittan 1977) have argued that conspicuous consumption is a new and vicious form of alienation whereby individuals are defined not by what they do (i.e., produce) but by what they own. For these critics, "lifestyle" is a symbol of the exploitation of mindless conformists at the hands of powerful manufacturers and marketers. However, such arguments neglect the very real effect of conspicuous consumption on many people's sense of self. For example, the adoption of particular designer clothing and footwear by large sections of the working classes (including prison inmates) is illustrative of the positive self-image that such symbolic gestures can generate in structural environments where self-esteem and aspiration are under constant assault. Bostyn and Wight (1987) understand this relationship well, arguing that "the goods people choose to buy are a physical expression (often not conscious) of their characters, or at least what they want to project as such" (p. 140). They emphasize the intrinsically masculine attributes of many commodities and suggest that one's identity as an adult, a

father, and a man are inextricably bound up in commodities such as meat, machines, and alcohol. The deprivation of such items—particularly when associated with the inability to purchase them with a “man’s wage”—emasculates the individual and attacks his sense of self-worth. Likewise, in prisons, the deprivation of material goods (Sykes 1958) arguably heightens the need for and value of consuming and spectacle, both as a restorer of the embattled and emasculated self and, more fundamentally, to bring color into an otherwise drab and uniform environment. Prison cells might be furnished with the aspirational symbols of media-saturated consumer capitalism—posters of glamour models and pop stars, pictures of expensive sports cars, hi-tech audio equipment and, increasingly, televisions—but to reduce these symbols to mere products of an exploitative ad-man’s desire to take advantage of passive dopes who know no better negates the real sense of agency and empowerment that the choice, purchase, and use of these consumables can produce—albeit, that it is within a structure of domination and exploitation. Material aspirations and lifestyle choices might thus be interpreted as positive adaptations to confinement and are often considered sufficiently prized to guarantee status. But more importantly, such statements of style may nourish the self and counter the feelings of dependency and weakness that incarceration can foster.

References to feelings of emasculation among male prisoners are common (see, e.g., Sykes 1958; Goffman 1961a; Toch 1975), and, of course, the relative scarcity of women in men’s prisons represents a problem for the presentation of the robust sexual appetite normally associated with manhood to the extent that some researchers have likened imprisonment to physical castration (Sykes 1958; Segal 1990). Because we partially define ourselves in relation to what we are not, the inmate’s sense of identity is distorted by his predominantly male environment and undergoes a “disidentifying role,” inducing a fear of losing his sense of masculinity (Goffman 1961b, 23). Isolated from the world of women who, by their very polarity, give the male world much of its meaning, the inmate is unable to seek reflection of his identity in the eyes of those who, by their “other-ness,” traditionally give him a masculine sense of self. A common response to this problem among prison inmates is to take up bodybuilding, which may serve the purpose of attracting a mate or, conversely, of warding off potential advances. In prison, keeping physically fit is understandable, given the level of fear among inmates and prison officers. More than that, however, the serious pursuit of an excessively muscular physique is significant in terms of the presentation of self as a powerful and self-controlled individual. The body is constructed as a site of difference in relation to others who are physically less strong and is a key performative device. In institutions where standard prison clothing is issued, remodelling the body may be the primary means of asserting one’s individual personality and gaining ground in an overtly competitive environment. It is a statement of presence and of power (which obviously makes it attractive to

those who are marginalized or disempowered), and it represents the ultimate achievement of self-control and agency. Not only do individuals form an understanding of themselves by continually reworking their sense of self as they go through life, but their personal biography is also constructed partly through the systematic ordering of the body through fitness, shape, and diet (Giddens 1991). Put simply, the constructed, labored-over body is the locus of an undervalued presence in the world, albeit one that is open to reconstruction and the pleasures of narcissism:

It holds the years back while you're in jail if you take care of yourself. You want to come out as fit if not fitter. You look better, feel better, and it shows *them* [the prison officers] that you can handle yourself. (Brian)

In my last jail I had a role model—a boxer. He got me into training. He was the hardest man in the prison—everyone respected him, so they respected me because I hung around with him. Those of us who train together have camaraderie, we tell each other stories. The gym also helps me cope with stress. When I've had a bad day I go down there and work it off. After half an hour's circuit training or weights I feel better—and better about myself, I suppose. I'm quite vain to be honest with you! (David)

Like conspicuous consumption, then, bodybuilding has the slightly paradoxical benefit of both enhancing public image and nourishing a positive sense of self. It appeals to those inmates who wish to use the institution for whatever benefits might be available, including social interaction with others, or who wish to flaunt their strength in front of their guards and other inmates. But equally, it is a form of protection and preservation of self that appeals to those who prefer to withdraw from the inmate culture and who are attracted to a solitary, narcissistic pursuit that entails no relation to other inmates (Ward Jouve 1988).

It may be supposed, then, that even in the highly constrained environment of the prison society, there exist many permutations of the “proof” of masculinity to respond to the imperative for inmates to fashion a masculine “way of being” (Pronger 1990) as an adaptive stance to the patterns imposed on them by their environment. Indeed, an emerging theme in the literature on constructions of masculinity is that many social institutions organize masculine power through constructs of sexuality, socializing their inhabitants in the ways of “doing” heterosexuality as a means of validating their masculinity and gaining acceptance to the group:

There's a lot of homophobia in prisons. [This unit] is full of vulnerable prisoners, grasses and nonces. There have been two punishment beatings over here in the last month—that's the nature of this prison. If you're gay, you keep it to yourself. You act tough and stay cool. You join in with the banter about the female screws and you keep your head down. The greatest tool a prisoner can have is to stay calm and in control and not show any vulnerability. (Paul)

However, as argued previously, such examples of impression management belie the real identity beneath and ignore the complex interaction between biological determinants, psychological processes, and social expectations. Not all prisoners will possess the "cultural capital" (Bourdieu 1977) necessary to sustain a superficial identity, and, even if they are able to present an acceptable public facade, it represents only half of the picture and misses entirely what goes on inside their bearer. As Craib comments, "*social* identities can come and go but *my* identity goes on as something which unites all the social identities I ever had, have or will have. . . . [It] overflows, adds to, transforms the social identities that are attached to me" (Craib 1998, 4; emphasis added). In short, identity is not just concerned with the outward presentation of self, but it is the ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity to maintain a sense of ontological security (Giddens 1984). Furthermore, while it may be the gift of some men to play at will with the conventions of gender, many others will be constrained from doing so by a variety of psychological and cultural impediments, especially in an environment as unpredictable, frightening, and alien as the prison.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This article has argued that the overt masculinity evident in so many studies of imprisonment has parallels in the wider culture beyond the prison walls. Many studies have suggested that the criminal life of the offender begins with some degree of contact with delinquent or offending peers, through whom a criminal identity and perspective is acquired. Echoing Goffman's use of the term, Irwin (1970) states that any new phase of the offender's "career," including the frequently cyclical path through arrest, sentencing, imprisonment, and release, is structured by meanings and definitions brought to the phase from perspectives gathered earlier. Criminality as a learned response to the imperatives enforced by hegemonic masculinity is suggested in a number of inmates' autobiographical accounts and sociological studies of lower working-class culture show the excessive display of one's masculinity, including aggressive and violent behavior, to be a central feature of working-class life. It hardly needs to be stated that any previous contact or involvement with criminal perspectives and behavior systems prior to arrest will inevitably shape the new inmate's overriding prison identity and coping strategies.

But given the evidence for the brutalizing and psychologically damaging effects of imprisonment, it would be naive to suggest (as do Irwin and Cressey 1962; Irwin, 1970) that the prison is simply one functioning part of a wider criminal mechanism and that inmates only adapt to incarceration to the extent of it being another integrated episode within a long criminal career. Indeed, to suggest that the social life of a prison revolves entirely around

essentialist male beliefs and criminal ideologies not only presupposes that the inmate culture is virtually identical across all male prisons regardless of category, physical location, and management policy, but is also tantamount to blaming the victims of the bullying, oppression, and fear that characterize many prisons (Stevens 1994). Whatever their circumstances, individuals are not mere bearers of structure; they are complex amalgams of several influences, responding to their life experiences with greater or lesser degrees of compliance and confrontation, defining their own individuality in terms of both cultural conformity and resistance. As Layder comments, "unique psychobiographical experiences will intersect with the dynamics of particular situations and the influence of wider social contexts to determine a person's behaviour" (Layder 1994, 210). In prisons, as in other spheres of life, the marking of "sameness" and "difference" is crucial to the construction of identity positions, and both may be reproduced and mediated through a range of symbolic systems and through forms of social inclusion and exclusion. For example, individuals may be marginalized (or accepted) on the basis of the crimes for which they are serving a prison sentence or for their stance on a particular aspect of the prison culture, such as drug use, or indeed, "otherness" might be conferred on much more mundane and spurious grounds. Although various types of masculinity are adopted to counter some aspects of marginalization (scholar, skilled tradesman, and expert in legal matters and prisoners' rights are common examples), an extreme construction of masculinity as an identity position is the most universal response to the imperative to conform to the lower working-class dominated prison culture. It is thus simultaneously a reflection of wider social norms and a response to the specific, unique properties of imprisonment. But not every inmate will conform to the hegemonic masculine ideal; as demonstrated, hegemonic masculinity carries no intrinsic meaning without the subordinated versions against which it is pitched.

It must be assumed, then, that behavioral patterns constructed around violence and manliness in prison are not simply a facsimile of the outside world, even among the underclass that provides the prison with the majority of its inmates. Criminal perspectives learned earlier in life combine with the pains of imprisonment to give rise to an enhanced or exaggerated form of masculinity. As a response to the label *prisoner*, with all its connotations of weakness, conformity, and the relinquishing of power, manliness (or a version of it) becomes the primary means of adaptation and resistance. The same forces that exist throughout the patriarchal world and that find their least sophisticated expression among underclass males exist in prison to sustain an equilibrium where power is held by those who maintain a hegemonic masculine front, amounting to an abhorrence of femininity (in men as well as women), aggressive homophobia, and a personal code of behavior based on confrontation and force rather than negotiation and respect; in short, a hyper-masculinity in which "normal" values and behavioral patterns of power-

ful men take on an extreme form in the face of powerlessness against the institution.

NOTES

1. All quotes from prisoners are taken from interviews conducted by the author at two Category C prisons in the English Midlands in April 1999.
2. From the German *Männerbünde*, or men's league, coined by early German sociologists to denote the kind of fraternity described here.
3. Peter Sutcliffe has been assaulted several times by fellow inmates, which may be partially explained by the role of the tabloid press who give a high profile to some criminal cases and encourage other prisoners to place themselves in the role of vigilantes on behalf of society at large. The fact that the tabloids enjoy the highest circulation figures among the British press—reporting the lurid details of crimes against the most vulnerable members of society yet frequently failing to report subsequent assaults by some prisoners on their fellow inmates—is perhaps a further indication of the implicit sanction which society places on the exertion of hegemonic masculine values over weaker, subordinated ones.

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